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ABSTRACT

Traditional digital forensics‘ procedures to recover and analyze digital data were focused
on media-type storage devices like hard drives, hoping to acquire evidence or traces of
malicious behavior in stored files. Usually, investigators would image the data and
explore it in a somewhat ―safe‖ environment; this is meant to reduce as much as possible
the amount of loss and corruption that might occur when analysis tools are used.
Unfortunately, techniques developed by intruders to attack machines without leaving files
on the disks and the ever dramatically increasing size of hard drives make the discovery
of evidence difficult. These increased interest in research on live forensics (attempting to
obtain evidence while the system is running) and on volatile memory forensic analysis.
Because of the important role they play in computing systems, volatile memory is a
source of information about running processes, network connections, opened files and/or
loaded kernel modules that might be valuable to forensic investigations.
In this thesis we show that when provided with an image of the physical memory of a
Linux system, it is possible to extract data about a specific running process, enough to be
able to resume its execution on a prepared environment. We also describe two proof-ofconcept tools gettsk and memexec developed for this purpose. This would allow
investigators to not only obtain information about a suspicious running task from a RAM
dump, but also to perform further inquiry through techniques such as malware analysis.

viii

1. INTRODUCTION

Digital forensic investigations aim at establishing the patterns, causes and
consequences of attacks on a computer system. Investigators attempt to determine the
nature and chronology of events that might have caused system failure or loss of valuable
assets. They seek evidence of changes in configurations and any artifact that could alter
the behavior of the system or put it in an undesirable state. This is done mainly by
capturing and analyzing storage devices for threats and exploited vulnerabilities. In some
cases, malicious software (or malware) are responsible for the misbehavior, in which
situation suspected software programs are identified and studied through a set of
activities called malware analysis. These techniques help determine what damages the
malware can expose the system to, thus allowing investigators to take appropriate
decisions and measures to mitigate and ultimately annihilate its effects. Because of the
danger they represent, it is commonly recommended to perform forensic analyses of
malicious programs in a non-production and heavily controlled environment.
Historically, only permanent storage media such as hard disk drives were
examined by investigators who hoped to find evidence in files on disk. Since they do not
lose their contents when the machine is powered down, researchers have been able to
develop methods to analyze files and their associated metadata for knowledge valuable to
forensic investigations. However, they do not constitute the only sources of information;
a considerable amount of data about computer systems can be obtained by exploring the
contents of volatile media amid the primordial role they play in performing operating
systems tasks. It is possible, for example, to obtain information about the processes
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running on a host at a given time, as well as associated objects such as opened/mapped
files and network connections, by examining the physical memory. However, the volatile
nature of the memory and the fact that their use is highly operating system-dependent
make the acquisition and analysis of its contents challenging. Even when the RAM is
successfully acquired and enough process-specific data retrieved, it is still difficult to
perform an effective malware analysis.
In this document, we describe ways to collect information about a running
process, when provided with an image of a Linux 2.6 physical memory, and resume its
execution on another host. This will permit investigators not only to examine the data for
evidence, but also to perform further malware analysis in a controlled environment.

1.1. Background, Overview and Problem Statement

Computer-related attacks against individuals and companies referred to as
cybercrime, have been on the rise for the past decades. Various types of cybercrime exist
depending on parameters such as the target and the techniques used to execute the attack;
they are often classified as follows with respect to the crime perpetrated [16]:

- Identity theft: Access to and misuse of personal information for fun or profit.
-

Cyber harassment: Use of computer systems to threaten or stalk another person.

-

Unauthorized access to computer systems or data: Also known as computer
crime.

-

Fraud: Bank and other financial fraud, data piracy.
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-

Non-access computer crimes: causing damage without gaining control of the
computer system. This includes for example denial-of-service and virus attacks.

The consequences of these attacks on personal and group welfare are considerable as
shown by an Identity Theft Resource Centre (ITRC) report, which states that 662 major
data breaches were identified in 2010, exposing more than 16 million personal records
[29]. The U.S. department of Justice also reported from a survey that 67% of
participating businesses have been victims of at least one cybercrime in 2005, with a total
in losses estimated at $867 million [38]. In a similar survey, the Computer Security
Institute (CSI) found out that the average loss per business in 2007 was around $350,000,
nearly the double of the previous year results [39]. Cybercrime has escalated to introduce
the concept of cyber warfare, which refers to actions that a country/nation or
governmental organization takes to compromise the computing systems of other
countries‘/nations‘ in order to disrupt, create damage or obtain secret information. A
recent example of such actions is the Stuxnet worm that spread around the world and
targeted specific industrial control systems [45]. Therefore, the need for digital forensic
investigations and malware analysis techniques, to better understand these attacks and
reduce the effects of cybercrime, is growing very fast and so is research in these areas.
Early digital forensics efforts were focused on permanent media storage, since the
filesystem can be preserved and studied to detect anomalies [8]. Their contents are
imaged or copied into other devices and generally attached to different machines for
further investigation. Unfortunately, intruders have developed techniques to hide tracks
of their mischief such as deleting compromising evidence, and performing their attacks
without leaving files on the disks. Also, it is difficult to obtain information about the

4
programs running on the system, the network connections opened, the loaded kernel
modules or other process and operating system-related artifacts at the time of acquisition,
as they are generally stored on main memory. This increased the interest in live forensics
(attempt to obtain evidence while the system is running) and in the analysis of volatile
media such as the Random Access Memory or RAM. The storage acquisition and
analysis methodologies as well as their limitations are developed in Section 2.1.2.
The main memory plays an important role to the effective functioning of a
computing system, as it is used to keep track of the interactions between the OS, the
applications running on the machine, the filesystem and the hardware (CPU). Therefore,
harvesting the contents of the RAM is of undeniable value to a forensic investigation,
especially if the acquisition is done correctly, at the right time and can be parsed for
evidence. For instance, some passwords and encryption keys can be found in memory
[25, 30], as well as structures holding important information about running processes
[43]. Fortunately, in the past decade, major progress in documenting what kind of data
can be extracted from an image of RAM and how to obtain it have been made (discussed
in Section 2.3). However the resulting tools and techniques are mostly operating systemdependent, because of the differences in the way each uses the memory. Furthermore,
investigators do not have a complete understanding of what incidents might have
happened on the system just from a memory analysis, since the results are mainly
presented in the form of lists (such as list of running processes, open files and network
connections) and represent the state of the machine at a specific moment (they do not
include an evolution of the situation over time).
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In light of all the above, two questions concerning the forensic analysis of
physical memory come to mind. First, when provided with the RAM dump of a machine,
what kind of data can be extracted? Second, how can we make the obtained information
more useful to investigations?
Taking into consideration the fact that most of the incidents happening on computers are
linked to applications, our approach is concentrated on acquiring knowledge about
specific processes being run on the machine when the RAM was captured and restoring
their execution state. Is all the data necessary to bring a process back to life available
from the memory image? Assuming the answer is affirmative, how hard is it to resume a
process? What kind of environment is required? These are some of the questions that will
be considered in this thesis.

1.2. Purpose and Motivation

The purpose of our work is to determine to what extent it is possible to collect
data about a specific process running on the machine and resume its execution on another
―safe‖ environment, from an image of the memory of a Linux 2.6 kernel.
The immediate benefit that such a capability offers is bringing together the
advantages of both ―dead‖ and ―live‖ forensic analysis techniques (described in Section
2.1.1). Indeed, obtaining an image of the RAM allows the investigation to be performed
with minimum corruption of the state of the original machine; Meanwhile gathering the
context and environment of a process and resuming its execution on a prepared host gives
more confidence in the integrity of the live tools used [35]. It would also permit
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investigators to have a repeatable analysis process (which is of great value when evidence
is presented in a court of law) and give them the ability to perform additional inquiries on
extracted artifacts without risk to production systems.
An important aspect of digital forensics and incident response is the study of malicious
software or malware analysis in order to determine their purpose, stop their progression
and/or protect against their propagation (See Section 2.2). One of the techniques used
here is dynamic malware analysis, which involves running the malware to observe and
monitor its interactions with the system rather than attempting to determine the malware
execution path without actually running it. Our work could allow investigators to perform
dynamic malware analysis on a suspicious program rebuilt from an image of the RAM.
A more detailed description of the potential benefits of our work can be found in Section
2.5.

1.3. Document Structure

This document is divided in six parts. Following this introduction, Chapter 2
gives a general overview of the field of digital forensics and presents prior work related
to the analysis of physical memory; the contributions that our study bring are also
discussed. Chapter 3 documents what relevant information about a running process is
available in a Linux RAM and where to locate it in the 2.6 kernel. Chapter 4 and Chapter
5 describe in detail, the activities to perform in order to acquire and store process specific
data, as well as ways to transport the execution of the process onto another host. They
both include a proof-of-concept experiment showing results produced by applying the
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described methods. We conclude with a summary of the thesis, a statement of the major
problems encountered during research as well as future work.

2. DIGITAL FORENSICS BACKGROUND, RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTION

This chapter presents a general view of what digital forensics and malware
analysis are about, followed by a review of major developments in the forensic analysis
of physical memory. We close the chapter with an enumeration of the potential benefits
that our research can bring to the forensics community.

2.1. Overview of Digital Forensics Process and Practices

According to Wiles [51], digital forensics can be defined as ―the preservation,
identification, extraction, interpretation and documentation of computer evidence‖. This
definition suggests that to get the best results acceptable in a legal system, investigations
require a variety of activities (preservation, extraction, interpretation and documentation).
Over the years, researchers have proposed different processes and codes of conduct to
perform these various tasks. The following sections describe general digital forensics
investigation process models as well as the major activities they comprise.

2.1.1. Digital Forensics Methodologies
A main concept in defining digital forensics models, consists in following existing
procedures used for physical crime scenes, and includes technology-specific guidelines.
Carrier and Spafford proposed a model of digital investigation, admissible in a court of
law, which easily integrates with refined law enforcement methodologies for a mutual
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benefit [11]. The result of such collaboration is a link between human suspects and digital
evidence. Carrier summarizes the process into three general stages [7]:
-

Preservation: Collect and copy the digital data in its entirety and integrity.

-

Search and Analysis: includes examination, interpretation and recovery of the
acquired data.

-

Reconstruction: report and documentation of events leading to the crime.

In practice however, applying these recommendations is not a simple issue; factors
surrounding the investigation such as the state of the machine at different stages of the
process have to be taken into account.
In the early years of digital forensics, “dead” acquisition was used. This method requires
investigators to power down the machine(s) to be examined to avoid potential loss or
modification of data on the system. Afterwards, media such as hard drives and other datapersistent devices are harvested for analysis (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1. ―Dead‖ Forensic Acquisition [31]
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Figure 2. ―Live‖ Forensic Acquisition [31]

More recently, new techniques emerged to acquire and analyze data while the system is
still running. They form what is called ―live‖ forensic analysis (see Fig. 2). It is worth
noting that both Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not address acquiring volatile data, illustrating
the fact that it was not appropriately considered in early forensic investigations.
Lessing and Von Solms published a comparative study of both frameworks (―dead‖ and
―live‖ forensic analysis) [31]. According to their observations, ―dead‖ analysis
procedures are straightforward and more or less platform independent. Also, chances that
evidence are corrupted are very small since the computer is not running. However, dead
forensic analysis presents some limitations, which include:
-

Volatile data (data that exist when the machine is running and is destroyed
after a shutdown) such as network information and physical memory are
difficult to acquire, even impossible when the system is already shut down.
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-

With the increasing size of hard drives, investigations become timeconsuming and valuable evidence could be missed as a consequence of the
large amount of information.

-

It is now common practice to use encryption on disks for protection against
attackers who have physical access to the system. When the machine is
powered off, the encryption keys (usually residing in memory) necessary to
access the contents of the storage device are not available [25, 26]. In such
situations, the investigator may not be able to analyze the collected data.

Live forensic analysis on the other hand allows analysis of volatile data through
techniques such as ―trusted‖ command shells (local analysis) or remote connections
(network analysis). The investigators interact directly with the underlying operating
system and therefore have access to the memory; with the appropriate credentials, disk
encryption is not an issue anymore [26]. Live analysis however can be associated with
shortcomings that can diminish the value of forensic evidence in court [31, 9, 26]:
-

Evidence can be altered. Because of the interaction with the operating system,
tools or mistakes from the investigator might modify files and/or memory
locations on the system and potentially affect evidence.

-

The tests performed during live forensics are generally not repeatable, since
the state of the system changes.

-

The tools are platform dependent. Every system is different, so the tools must
be tailored to fit specific platforms: what works for one might not be usable in
the other.
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-

The presence of a kernel rootkit (malicious software running on a system, at
the kernel level and with privileged permissions while at the same time hiding
its existence to users by changing the normal behavior of the operating
system) could provide investigators with erroneous, incomplete or no
information at all.

An alternative to both ―dead‖ and live analysis would be to complementarily combine
them during a unique investigation process. Mrdovic et al. [35] claim that such a
combination is feasible with the use of memory imaging/dumping and virtualization.
Indeed, both persistent and volatile data could be imaged/copied and then the studied
machine powered down. Finally, a virtual environment could be created to mimic the
behavior of the investigated computer. At this point, some ―live‖ interaction could
happen without significant impact on the integrity of the collected evidence. Although
most of the shortcomings of dead analysis do not apply when this technique is used and
the process is repeatable, the live interaction in the virtual machine is still operatingsystem based and thus subject to evidence manipulation.

2.1.2. Digital Forensics Activities
2.1.2.1. Acquisition and Preservation
It is crucial for investigators to correctly collect and preserve data from machines;
any mistake could lead to loss of evidence or rejection from court. Carrier indicates that a
great deal of information pertaining to a digital forensic investigation can be obtained
from files in external storage media like hard drives [8]. He also describes general
techniques used to acquire data from these devices, such as the dd command in UNIX
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systems, which performs a byte-to-byte copy from one medium to the other, and the
concept of hashing to verify the integrity of copied data.
Unfortunately, in addition to the disk encryption discussed earlier, hard drives wear out
over time or can be damaged; also, attackers have developed ways to hide their tracks
through data destruction (deleting files potentially containing evidence of intrusion) [23]
and data contraception (performing attacks without writing to any file on disk, also
referred to as memory resident malware) [24]. Therefore, the interest in obtaining other
sources of data such as volatile storage media grew significantly.
Because of the transient nature of volatile data, its acquisition is challenging and
time sensitive. Methods and tools exist to efficiently dump the RAM, classified by
Burdach in two major groups [6]: Software and hardware-based methods.
-

Software-based memory acquisition consists of utilities loaded on the live
system to dump the RAM on an external device. Generally, the effects of
running the toolkit on the system are known to the investigator and are
considered during analysis. However, if the machine is infected, there is a
chance that the tool used to image the memory gets compromised by the
malicious program and that misleading evidence is produced. Moreover, it is
difficult to verify that the imaging operation was performed correctly, since
the memory is constantly changing. These integrity and verifiability issues are
not a concern in a virtual environment as most of the virtualization toolkits
(such as VMware and Xen) provide mechanisms to acquire a snapshot of the
RAM (pause the execution of the host and collect the memory) [47]. The
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contents of memory are constantly changing and thus data collected by the
software tool might be inconsistent.
-

Hardware-based methods implant devices on the computer to bypass the
Operating System. They use DMA (Direct Memory Access) to access the
RAM and copy its contents to external storage media. Unfortunately, attackers
might be able to detect the devices and as a result, provide erroneous
information. An example of such hardware components includes a hidden PCI
card that would be visible to the machine only when enabled by an
investigator; however, this method is impractical as it requires the PCI card to
be installed and configured on the machine before the incident occurs [10].
Also, a firewire device (IEEE 1394) that accesses the physical memory
independently of the CPU can be used [34]. This firewire acquisition
technique can slightly modify the state of the machine (in case the operating
system has to activate the port) and, if not properly performed, crash the
system.

Contrary to popular belief, some of the RAM hardware on the market does not
immediately lose their contents when the system is powered down; there is a small time
window of data persistence (several seconds), which could be significantly extended by
freezing the RAM chips [25].

This retention capability could be exploited by

investigators to copy the contents of the memory by rapidly restarting the machine after a
shutdown; the full operating system is not loaded, rather, a specially crafted program
installed on a USB drive or attached to a network/firmware boot is used to start the
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machine and dump the contents of the RAM [25]. This method however presents a timing
challenge, and can be tried only once: in case of failure, everything will be lost.
2.1.2.2. Data Analysis
Much information can be obtained by examining the data acquired from a hard
drive for a forensic investigation: deleted files can be restored; log files, browsing history
and more can help support or refute theories about the incidents [8]. The investigators
typically have to rebuild the volumes and partitions from the image, based on the specific
type of file systems in use, and then search through the files for tangible evidence. The
rapid increase in hard-drive size, the proliferation of file types/formats and the rise of
storage management technologies such as RAID and LVM have complicated the
investigators‘ ability to discover evidence. In such situations, information gathered by
analyzing the physical memory can be particularly useful since they might provide
preliminary answers and help the investigator prioritize on the type of information to look
for in the filesystem. Also, as researchers are developing more ways to extract, parse and
study the contents of memory, some investigators have started to give a lot more value to
the data from the RAM.
Despite the importance of the information that could be found in the RAM,
research in forensic analysis of memory is relatively young (no more than a decade old).
Initially, investigators derived clues by searching for strings on the binary dump of the
memory, hoping to uncover sequences of characters that might have a meaning such as
the name of a process or a loaded kernel module. Unfortunately, this method is not
efficient because of the important number of strings that can be found in a memory dump.
It was not until the release of the 2005 Memory Analysis Challenge for the 5th edition of
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the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) [2, 17], that an active community
began making progress on answering the question of what can be discovered given a
snapshot of memory (more details in Section 2.3).

2.2. Overview of Malware Analysis

In the aftermath of a computer attack, or after a security incident has been
detected, a set of activities, referred to as incident response, is generally performed to
identify the threats on the system, reduce potential damages and ultimately prevent the
attack to happen again in the future. The SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Networking and
Security) Institute proposed a standard approach to incident response composed of six
consecutive steps [15]: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery
and Lessons Learned.
Malware Analysis, the study of an unwanted and potentially malicious piece of software
(such as virus, Trojan, spyware, etc…), is an inherent part of the incident response
process and is usually associated with the identification phase. Indeed, malware analysis
activities attempt to determine exactly what actions the malware performs and to some
extent, how it was introduced into the system. This permits the responders to efficiently
recover from incidents and strengthen their system against similar infections.
The traditional methodology in performing malware analysis involves collecting all the
available artifacts (such as code and/or executable files) of the malicious software and
transporting them into a contained (i.e. cannot infect production machines) host
specifically prepared for observation and analysis. Depending on whether the malware is
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actually run or not, there exist two different types of malware analysis techniques: static
and dynamic analysis [15, 1].

2.2.1. Static Malware Analysis

Static analysis refers to the set of techniques used to determine how a piece of
malware works without executing it on a machine. This usually involves reverse
engineering the software and/or examining its code/binaries to understand what it is
supposed to do. The most common tools range from the advanced decompilers and
disassemblers to the simple source code viewers and string matching utilities [40]. Static
analysis permits investigators to walk through the malicious code and immediately
identify the weaknesses exploited by the malware and therefore plan for effective defense
mechanisms to be implemented on the system. Also, most or all of the execution paths of
the malicious software can be covered through this analysis method and it is usually
faster than dynamic analysis [15, 1, 17]. However, static analysis has a few limitations:
-

For large and complex code, it may be difficult to completely predict what
the malware does; Investigators sometimes have to approximate the
overall behavior.

-

Obfuscation techniques have been developed to make the disassembly and
reverse engineering process more difficult. Obfuscation is concerned with
modifying the structure and syntax of a program so that it would be hard
to dissect through code analysis, while at the same time conserving its
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functionality and efficiency. These techniques make static analysis harder,
not impossible.
-

Sometimes the code examined during static analysis is not necessarily the
code executed on the machine; metamorphic code (code that reprogram
itself) and polymorphic code (different code at each execution, though
having the same functionality) are examples of such programs and thus
static analysis may not be accurate in these cases.

-

It is also possible that the malware will respond differently depending on
an input provided. In some cases for example, that input represent
additional code that the attacker sends over the network and thus is not
necessarily available to the investigator.

2.2.2. Dynamic Malware Analysis

Dynamic malware analysis techniques, contrary to static analysis, attempt to
determine the interactions between the malware and the system, by actually running the
program and analyzing its behavior. Safety restrictions are more important in these
situations, since running the unknown piece of software could be disastrous for the host:
The malware could destroy key functionalities, break loose and potentially harm other
machines and networks. It is therefore imperative for the investigator to prepare a
contained and asset-free environment in which to launch the execution of the malware for
analysis. The common activities in dynamic analysis include monitoring the system and
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library calls made by the program or examining each machine instruction with the help of
debuggers or machine emulators [1, 17].
The major benefit of dynamic analysis over static analysis is the assurance that the
machine instructions being analyzed are the ones that the program actually executes; i.e.
it is not affected by techniques like obfuscation and polymorphic code. On the other
hand, dynamic analysis has some drawbacks:
-

For complex and large programs, it is difficult to run through all their
execution paths and thus predictions on their behavior in a random setup are
difficult to make.

-

In dynamic analysis, there is a limited view of the internals of the program.
Unless using a virtual machine (VM) coupled with introspection techniques
(monitoring and inspecting guest operating systems in a virtual environment
from the outside to observe behavior [36]), one can only observe input/output
and library/system calls.

-

The analysis environment is not invisible to the malware. As mentioned in the
previous paragraph, the safety measures taken in building the analysis
environment are of crucial importance. Malicious software can be tailored to
behave differently depending on the underlying configurations of the system.
For example, to ensure absolute containment, investigators can build a VM
similar the one infected, without network connections; however, it is possible
to determine that the program is running on a VM by checking the hardware
configurations that virtualization software usually utilize, through techniques
such as timing attacks on virtual and emulated environments. An attacker
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could then program the software not to execute properly when such properties
are detected.

2.3. Advances in Forensic Analysis of Physical Memory
Numerous utilities have been developed to help investigators perform memory
analysis. Most of these tools are however platform dependent, due to the unique way each
operating system (and even specific versions) handles the RAM. We now present some of
these tools and related developments, organized with respect to the underlying family of
operating systems.

2.3.1. RAM Analysis on Microsoft Windows
The DFRWS challenge, mentioned in Section 2.1.2.2 above, provided contestants
with a memory dump from a Windows 2000 machine to be analyzed. From this emanated
two research results:
First, Betz studied the way the Windows 2000 kernel uses the memory, and designed a
command line tool called Memparser that produces a list of running processes on the
system, even the ones that were hidden to the operating system [2].
Garner and Mora developed KnTList (part of the now commercial toolset KnTTools),
which could list the running and hidden processes on the machine, as well as access some
other system‘s information such as time parameters and ARP cache [19].
In 2005, Burdach published a guide to discovering Windows 2000 and Windows XP
kernel data structures. He developed a follow-up tool WMFT (Windows Memory
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Forensics Toolkit), which can enumerate active processes and loaded modules as well as
other kernel structures such as driver objects when provided with their addresses in
memory.
A year later, Schuster created the tool PTfinder which is capable of discovering, from an
image of the RAM, all processes and threads running on Windows NT systems (including
ones that were potentially deleted by kernel attacks or persisted through a reboot). This
utility also provided users with a graphical and hierarchical view of the processes
discovered, so investigators could easily determine parental relationships between the
threads [42].
In 2007, Walters and Petroni introduced a set of tools to analyze memory dumps from
Windows XP SP2 systems: volatools. The suite evolved to become The Volatility
Framework, one of the most used open source toolkits for Windows memory forensic
analysis. It provides important functionalities, such as [50]:
-

Information on running processes and threads (list of open files, addressable
memory, loaded DLLs)

-

Information on network connections

-

Support for different types of memory dumps (Windows crash dumps,
hibernation)

-

Information about the registry and loaded kernel modules

Moreover the framework can be extended through plug-ins and a beta version to support
Linux operating systems is currently in development [14].
Another well-known tool is Memoryze, developed by the company MANDIANT in 2008,
which has support for a variety of versions of the Microsoft Windows Operating System.
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Memoryze can allow its users to acquire an image of the RAM as well as perform the
analysis on both on live systems and RAM images. It provides the following, among
other features [33]:
-

List the virtual address space of a given process including:

-

List all network sockets that the process has open, including any hidden by
rootkits.

-

Specify the functions imported and exported by the EXE and DLLs.

-

Verify the digital signatures of the EXE and DLLs. (This is disk based.)

-

Output all strings in memory on a per process basis.

2.3.2. RAM Analysis on OSX

Research on memory analysis on OSX systems is still rudimentary: we were not
able to find any tool to perform analysis on OSX RAM. However, Suiche published a
paper describing the kernel internals of this operating system [43]. He laid out details on
memory management of processes, files and other kernel structures, necessary to retrieve
valuable information from MAC OSX memory dumps. Because OSX is a Unix-like
system and is largely based on BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution), it has similarities
with Linux kernel structures, such as the existence of a doubly-linked list object to keep
track of processes running on the machine (see Chapter 3).
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2.3.3. RAM Analysis on Linux
Various utilities for the forensic analysis of Linux RAM have been developed.
One of the earliest is Burdach‘s iDetect, a tool that can provide information about usermode processes running on the system, as well as files mapped into memory. It was
designed for Linux 2.4-x and uses the System.map file (symbol table used by the kernel)
to obtain the address of important kernel structures.
Urrea developed a proof-of-concept for what he called ―the basis of later research in
RAM forensics‖ [46]. He focused his efforts on kernel 2.6 and described means to obtain
information on running processes and recover files loaded in physical memory. He also
discussed ways to explore potential swap space, to complete the memory analysis.
In 2008, Case et al. proposed a framework, called FACE, for digital forensic investigation
that finds and correlates evidence from multiple sources (e.g. disk images, memory
images and network capture) and multiple targets [12]. Their framework included
Ramparser, a tool that analyzes Linux 2.6-x memory dumps and provides information on
running processes, network connections and loaded kernel modules. In an attempt to
reduce the platform dependency of Linux memory analysis tools, Ramparser was later
improved to support a variety of kernel versions [21]. This was achieved by dynamically
reverse engineering core kernel functions for each version, to obtain data structures‘
offsets necessary for a deep memory analysis and save them in an extensible database.
SecondLook, a commercial tool from Pikewerks Corporation was recently introduced
[37]. It provides users with a GUI interface for ease of use as well as a command line
interface for custom analysis. Running processes, network connections and loaded kernel
modules are some of the information the tool provides to investigators.
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Kollar developed a tool called Foriana that, when provided with a memory dump,
attempts to determine the corresponding operating system by using pattern matching and
performing a string search on the image (hoping to identify the name of a known standard
process such as ―init‖ for example for Linux systems) [30]. The tool uses heuristics to
find kernel structures in memory, and then generates a list of loaded modules and running
processes.
A more recent project started by Girault resulted in volatilitux [20]. volatilitux can extract
memory-mapped files from the RAM, output the list of running processes as well as
produce process-specific information such as the list of open files and memory mappings.

2.4. Work Related to Process Resumption

Resuming the execution of a process loaded in memory is closely related to the
way it has been extracted. Most of the efforts realized in this prospect, were directed
towards dumping the binaries of the process. The procmemdump and procexedump plugins of the Volatility tool are prime examples [50]: they permit investigators the obtain
executables from the memory of Windows systems. We could not find any similar work
for the analysis of an image of the Linux RAM. However, for live Linux systems, Ilo
presented a proof-of-concept tool to extract the binaries of a running process [28].
Although his primary goal consisted in building a single binary file from the artifacts
collected from the memory about a running process, he also proposed a sequence of steps
that one could take in order to recover the state of the process on another host or at
another time. His proposal included the following:
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-

Get the files used by the process, place them in the appropriate location and
open them.

-

Create a new process

-

Copy process segments and registers in the appropriate locations

-

Launch the execution of the process

An area of research related to our project is process migration or process
checkpoint/restart techniques on Linux systems, which is concerned with saving the state
of a running process from a live machine in order to resume its execution on another host
or for rollback purposes. Linking checkpointing and digital forensics is not a completely
new initiative, it was proposed by Foster and Wilson in their introduction to process
forensics [18]. They argue that checkpointing can be a powerful tool in the arms of the
digital forensic investigator or to the incidence response team, since crucial evidence can
be obtained from processes running on a host.
One approach to checkpointing consists in loading a kernel module into the system and
using it to save the state of a chosen process onto a file and restart its execution through
the same module. CRAK is an example of a tool that uses the Linux Kernel Module
(LKM) option to restart a previously saved Linux process or group of processes [52].
Currently, we did not find any work that extracts a running process from an image of
memory and resume its execution.

2.5. Contributions of our Work
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Many advantages can be associated with the recovery of the context of a running
process from a memory image as well the resumption of its execution in another
environment. We now present and discuss a non-exhaustive list of them in detail.

Benefits to General Forensic Investigations:

- We cannot stress enough the importance to a case, of the information that is
available when analyzing non-volatile storage. It is possible, for example to
determine what kind of machine it was in the first place (version of operating
system and underlying hardware characteristics in case this was not known), what
modules were loaded on the system and even find some password and encryption
keys that could help break a case. With the list of running processes that our work
provides, investigators might be able to identify unknown, unexpected and/or
potentially dangerous programs that were on the machine at the time of
acquisition of the RAM image. They could then take a closer look at the type of
resources that the process was accessing such as the user running the process, the
opened file descriptors (includes files, network connections and ports) and the
memory mappings.

- The fact that we are provided with an image of the memory would normally imply
the use of ―dead‖ analysis techniques, meaning that there would be no live
interaction and the observation of the evolution of the system over time is not an
option. As indicated in Section 2.1.1, it is possible to combine both ―live‖ and
―dead‖ analysis on one case, with the use of memory dumping and virtualization.
This is one of the main ideas behind our study, as the resumption component
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gives ―life‖ to the data obtained from the RAM and thus allows for ―live‖ analysis
to occur without significant changes to the integrity of the collected evidence.
Moreover, the problems of live techniques are minimized as the process is
repeatable and the impact of tools is limited.

Benefits to Malware Analysis:
After an investigator has detected a potentially harmful process running on a
machine, the next step is usually to perform malware analysis.

- The CPU state (register set), at the moment of acquisition of the memory, of the
process of interest is available and can be taken into account when reverse
engineering is performed. Moreover, the code section of the memory mappings
associated with the application can be dumped into binaries that can use for static
malware analysis.

- When provided with an image of RAM, being able to resume the execution of a
process so that dynamic analysis can be performed is already an important
contribution. More so, if the resumption phase can be done in a safe environment
built for the purpose of observation, as production systems will be compromised.
Our approach suggests building a virtual machine, similar to the original system
(which is actually a common malware analysis technique), in which the execution
of the program will continue. Most virtualization software provide additional
monitoring capabilities through VM introspection that could be useful to an
investigator.
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- A legitimate question to ask is why not dump the binaries of the process from the
memory and launch its execution from the beginning? This method has been used
before (see Section 2.4) and would certainly allow for malware analysis to take
place. The problem with this approach is that most attackers are aware of the
latest forensic techniques such as studying the binary in a virtual environment. To
work around such techniques, they tend to perform VM detection and/or check for
other configurations and change the behavior of the program accordingly. These
checks generally occur when the program starts its execution. Thus, if the process
is resumed from where it stopped when the memory image was collected, there is
a decent chance that this detection phase is over.

3. THE LINUX KERNEL AND PROCESS INFORMATION IN MEMORY

Before we describe how to obtain relevant information about a running process
from a RAM dump and resuming its execution, it is primordial to understand how the
Linux kernel manages the memory, especially process-specific data. Indeed, to maintain
control over the execution flow on the machine, the kernel must keep track of process
activity by storing various attributes such as the process‘ state, children and CPU
registers. A look into the C source code of the kernel reveals that this information is
organized in memory through a number of data structures—There are many ways to
access the source code of the Linux kernel such as looking at location /usr/src/linuxheaders-x/

(‗x‘ represents the kernel version) on the local machine (if the source files

are installed) or browsing online repositories [32]—The following subsections will
describe some of these data structures and their relationships, for the kernel version
2.6.35 on x86 systems, as well as present the memory management mechanisms used in
Linux.
3.1. Linux Memory Management
3.1.1. The Virtual Memory

To ensure that CPU multithreading and time-sharing (i.e. the possibility to have
more than one process use the same system resources over a certain period of time) are
efficient, it is crucial to share the physical memory between processes. Because of the
constraints and differences that may exist between the actual size of the physical memory
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and the amount of space needed by the all the programs running on the system, the Linux
operating system implements virtual memory, which is a layer of abstraction of the RAM
to processes and users.
On a 32-bit x86 system for example, the whole 232 = 4 GB addressable space, ranging
from 0x00000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF, is considered available to each user process and each
address is referred to as linear address or virtual address. The kernel, also uses a virtual
address space but splits it into two parts at the PAGE_OFFSET (macro defined as
0xC0000000)

mark: The first part (of size 3GB) is mapped to the currently running

process and changes at every context switch, while the second part is fixed and used for
other kernel operations [22]. As a result of this split, every user process reserves 1GB in
its linear address space mapped to the kernel‘s first virtual memory zone and used when
the process in running in kernel mode (See Fig. 3). The rest of the process‘ virtual space
is directly addressable and is divided into pages of size PAGE_SIZE (can be 4KB, 2MB or
4MB on x86. In practice, it is typically 4KB).

Figure 3. Virtual Memory Layout for User Mode Process
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3.1.2. From Virtual to Physical Memory: Translation and Paging

The actual physical memory does not follow the same scheme as its virtual
counterpart. Rather, physical addresses are used to map the memory cells in memory
chips and operating systems use a number of mechanisms to translate between the
physical and linear addresses.
Similar to the virtual address space of a user process, the RAM is divided into sets of
contiguous addresses called page frames. These frames are grouped into zones with
specific functions. In Linux for instance, there are three physical memory zones [22]:
-

ZONE_DMA:

From 0 to 16 MB, used for Direct Access Memory (DMA) page

frames.
-

ZONE_NORMAL:

Ranges from 16MB to 896MB, contains non-DMA pages with

virtual memory mapping.
-

ZONE_HIGHMEM

(if applicable): 896MB and onwards and is not directly

mapped to the kernel.
At boot time, Linux directly maps physical address 0 with the kernel virtual address
PAGE_OFFSET

(0xC0000000). Therefore, when faced with a kernel virtual address, its

physical equivalent is obtained simply by subtracting PAGE_OFFSET. For example, linear
kernel address 0xc0342FF4 corresponds to actual physical memory location 0x00342FF4.
The conversion process is completely different for user mode virtual addresses. In this
case, the Linux operating system uses virtual memory paging to map the virtual pages to
physical page frames in memory. The paging mechanism consists in dividing the linear
address in parts, used as offsets in mapping structures called page tables. In its version
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2.6.35, the kernel implements four levels (splitting up the linear address in up to five
parts) of page tables:
-

Page Global Directory (PGD)

-

Page Upper Directory (PUD)

-

Page Middle Directory (PMD)

-

Page Table (PTE)

These levels are linked to each other (in the order cited) and each table contains addresses
to a set of tables on the next level (see Fig. 4). This scheme was built to fit the 32-bit and
64-bit architectures, as well as the Physical Address Extension or PAE (support for some
Intel processors with 36 address pins, i.e. can address up to 64 GB of memory with three
page levels) and extended paging (translation for systems with 4MB page sizes with just
one page level) [3].

Figure 4. The Paging Mechanism [3]
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For Intel x86 32-bit systems, the virtual address is divided in two parts which serve as
offsets in the only two levels of page tables implemented (here, PUD and PMD do not
exist).
3.2. Process-Related Kernel Data Structures

3.2.1. The Process Descriptor

Probably the most important process bookkeeping kernel artifact, the process
descriptor is the entry point in memory to all the available information about a specific
process or task (as commonly referred to in the kernel jargon). It is represented by the
task_struct

(cf. Fig. 5) data structure defined in include/linux/sched.h (from the

top level directory of the kernel source code), whose fields are used to identify, store and
track the various aspects of a task including but not limited to [3, 40]:
-

Process State: Through the state field in the task_struct, the execution
status (running, stopped, interruptible or not, etc…) of the task is saved.

-

Process Id and Name: Mostly used for identification, the id and name of the
process are respectively kept in the pid and comm attributes in the
task_struct.

-

Credentials: These represent the permissions that are associated with the
process and are used to determine what operations the task is (or is not)
allowed to perform. It is represented in the process descriptor by an attribute
of type cred, a kernel structure defined in include/linux/cred.h. This
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structure contains information such as the user (uid) and group (gid) ids
associated with process.
-

Scheduling Properties: For a more efficient use of the CPU execution cycles
and control over the process switching and scheduling activities, the kernel
stores via the process descriptor a number of values such as the process
priority and scheduling queue.

-

Process Address Space: User space tasks require memory areas to store
segments (code, data, stack, etc…) or to map files. The set of virtual
addresses reserved for a process form its address space. The kernel keeps
track of these memory locations through the mm field of type mm_struct
(more details in Section 3.2.2).

-

Process Relationships: The process descriptor provides a link to the parent,
children and siblings processes (using respectively the parent, children and
sibling

-

fields) of a task.

Filesystem Properties: With the files and fs variables in task_struct, the
kernel can keep track of the files opened by a process as well as the current
working directory (more details in 3.2.3).

-

Process CPU-related information: The process descriptor, through a variable
of type thread_struct, also gives access to information about relations
between the process and the CPU, such as the address of the Kernel Mode
Stack of the process (location where the CPU registers of the process are
stored in memory).
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include/linux/sched.h
1168 struct task_struct {
1169
volatile long state;
/* -1 unrunnable, 0 runnable, >0 stopped*/
...
1170
void *stack;
1171
atomic_t usage;
1172
unsigned int flags;
/* per process flags, defined below */
...
1182
1183
int prio, static_prio, normal_prio;
1184
unsigned int rt_priority;
1185
const struct sched_class *sched_class;
1186
struct sched_entity se;
1187
struct sched_rt_entity rt;
1188
...
1221
struct list_head tasks;
...
1224
struct mm_struct *mm, *active_mm;
...
1243
pid_t pid;
1244
pid_t tgid;
...
struct task_struct *real_parent; /* real parent process */
1257
struct task_struct *parent;
...
1261
struct list_head children;
/* list of my children */
1262
struct list_head sibling;
...
1298
const struct cred *cred;
...
1305
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path*/
...
1319/* CPU-specific state of this task */
1320
struct thread_struct thread;
1321/* filesystem information */
1322
struct fs_struct *fs;
1323/* open file information */
1324
struct files_struct *files;
1325/* namespaces */
1326
struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
1327/* signal handlers */
1328
struct signal_struct *signal;
1329
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
1330
1331
sigset_t blocked, real_blocked;
1332
sigset_t saved_sigmask;
1333
struct sigpending pending;
...
1502};

Figure 5. Excerpt of task_struct
The kernel also keeps track of all the processes currently running on the machine by
maintaining a circular doubly linked list of process descriptors, through the tasks field
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(of type list_head, the kernel‘s implementation of a circular doubly linked list) in each
task_struct.

Therefore, it is possible to obtain a list of all running tasks by traversing

the linked list (See Appendix B), potentially starting from the kernel address of the
init_task

process (named swapper and first item in the doubly linked list). This address

can be obtained in various ways such as looking into the kernel symbol table file
/boot/System.map-x

(‗x‘ represents the kernel version) [46] and through heuristics-

based search performed on the memory image [20].
3.2.2. Process Address Space

The Linux kernel uses a set of related data structures to manage the virtual
memory space needed by a process. As stated in the previous subsection, each process
descriptor has a field of type mm_struct dedicated to that purpose. The mm_struct data
structure

sometimes

referred

include/linux/mm_types.h

to

as

the

memory

descriptor,

is

defined

in

and retains among others, the following information (See

Fig. 6):
-

Page Global Directory: The pgd field in mm_struct stores this value, which
represents the entry for this process‘ memory areas in the Page Global
Directory (see Section 3.1.2).

-

Memory Segments: The kernel also uses the mm_struct to monitor process‘
segments in memory. Thus the start_code and end_code attributes refer to
the limits of the text/code segment of a task, start_brk and brk to the
growing heap, start_data and end_data to the data section containing
initialized static variables, start_stack to the start of the stack region,
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-

arg_end

and arg_start to the command line arguments, env_start and

env_end

to the environment variables.

Memory Regions: These are non-overlapping sets of adjacent virtual
addresses that map into the various memory segments of a process. The mmap
field (of type vm_area_struct) of mm_struct points to the first of these
regions. A memory segment is actually a group of memory regions serving
the same purpose.

include/linux/mm_types.h
222 struct mm_struct {
223
struct vm_area_struct * mmap;
/* list of VMAs */
224
struct rb_root mm_rb;
...
236
pgd_t * pgd;
237
atomic_t mm_users;
/* How many users with user space? */
238
atomic_t mm_count;
/* How many references to "struct mm_struct"
(users count as 1) */
239
int map_count;
/* number of VMAs */
...
254
unsigned long start_code, end_code, start_data, end_data;
255
unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack;
256
unsigned long arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end;
257
...
313 };

Figure 6. Excerpt of mm_struct
For every task, the kernel maintains a linked-list of its associated memory regions.
Therefore, each vm_area_struct (defined in include/linux/mm_types.h) includes a
vm_next

field pointing to the next region on the list, as well as a link (through the vm_mm

attribute) back to the memory descriptor describing the address space they belong to. The
structure also has self-describing elements such as vm_start, vm_end
vm_page_prot,

and

respectively representing the beginning address, end address and access

38
permissions of the region. In case the vm_area_struct describes a non-anonymous
memory-mapped disk file or shared library, the vm_file field is non-null and points to a
file

structure (see Section 3.2.3), while vm_pgoff represents the offset of the region in

the mapped file in question. Fig. 7 gives a sample overview of the kernel structures
related to a task‘s address space and their relationships.

Figure 7. Process Address Space Structures
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3.2.3. Processes and Filesystem Kernel Structures

Processes in Linux constantly interact with files on disks; they are either mapped
in memory for easier access or opened for basic input/output operations. However,
regular named disk files are not the only type of files in the Linux system: directories,
symbolic links, device files, sockets and pipes are all considered files [3, 40]. The Linux
kernel uses a number of structures to store and maintain data on the relationships between
process and files:

-

fs_struct:

Defined in include/linux/fs_struct.h, it is accessed from

the process descriptor of a task through the fs field and keeps information on
the current working directory (pwd attribute), the root directory (root
attribute) and their associated mounted filesystem. The same fs_struct can
be shared between different processes that are executing from the same
location; the field count is used to store the number of process descriptors
linked to this structure.
-

files_struct:
files

also accessible from a process‘ task_struct through the

attribute, it is defined in include/linux/fdtable.h and is

sometimes referred to as the open file table structure to describe the type of
information it holds. The fdt field of files_struct is of type fdtable
(also called file descriptor table) that keeps, among other data, the maximum
number of files that a process can have opened (max_fds field) and the array
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of file descriptors currently opened by the task. In Linux, the first three
entries are stdin, stdout and stderr.
file

-

(see Fig. 8): defined in include/linux/fs.h and referred to as file

descriptor, it is the main structure used by the kernel to get information about
the relationship between a process and the file, such as the process access
mode (attribute f_mode), the current offset (f_pos) and a pointer to the file
operations table (f_op; the table stores pointers to functions that are
associated with the file). The structure also holds general file data including
the user credentials (f_cred) as well as the directory entry (from which the
pathname of the file can be constructed), and its associated mounted
filesystem metadata, both accessible through the f_path field.

include/linux/fs.h
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
...
950
...
954

struct file {
/*
* fu_list becomes invalid after file_free is called and queued via
* fu_rcuhead for RCU freeing
*/
union {
struct list_head
fu_list;
struct rcu_head
fu_rcuhead;
} f_u;
struct path
f_path;
#define f_dentry
f_path.dentry
#define f_vfsmnt
f_path.mnt
const struct file_operations
*f_op;
spinlock_t
f_lock; /* f_ep_links, f_flags, no IRQ */
atomic_long_t
f_count;
unsigned int
f_flags;
fmode_t
f_mode;
loff_t
f_pos;
struct fown_struct
f_owner;
const struct cred
*f_cred;
struct address_space

*f_mapping;

};

Figure 8. Excerpt from file
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Although the concepts and design remain the same for subversions of Linux 2.6,
there might exist some slight differences in the code of the described structures. The
disparities become greater when compared with older versions such as Linux 2.4. For
example, rather than having an entire structure to handle process credentials (i.e. the field
struct cred

in the process descriptor), Linux 2.4 and even early Linux 2.6 versions just

had extra fields added to the task_struct (uid, gid, suid, etc…). This is one of
reasons why most the tools developed to analyze the RAM are operating systemdependent. To this effect, our experiment was entirely performed on machines running
the same Linux distribution, on top of the same kernel version 2.6.35, even though it
might work on different versions.

4. EXTRACTING PROCESS INFORMATION FROM THE RAM (GETTSK)

Chapter 3 gives an overview of how the Linux operating system manages the
memory and keeps track of the tasks running on the machine. Now, we discuss the
mechanisms necessary to retrieve process-related information, when provided with an
image of the RAM of a Linux system. We start by describing the environment setup to
carry out our experiment; then we document what specific data is extracted as well as
how do to it. We conclude the chapter by presenting the results and discussing the
limitations of our approach on the proof-of-concept.

4.1. Initial Setup and Image Acquisition

In order to perform the procedures described in the next sections, we need the
image of the physical memory acquired from a Linux machine. To that end, a virtual
environment was built with the following specifications:
 Virtualization Software: VMware Workstation 6.5.7
 Operating System: 32-bit Linux Ubuntu 10.10 – Kernel 2.6.35.22
 Amount of RAM: 512 MB
 Hard Drive: 20 GB, with no swap space.
These configurations were not selected randomly. Indeed, the virtual setup would allow
us to easily obtain the contents of the RAM, as virtualization software such as VMware
use a file on the disk of the host computer (physical machine on which the environment is
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built) to simulate the memory. When a snapshot of the virtual machine is taken, or when
it is pause at some point in time, that file (with .vmem extension if VMware is used) can
be copied and will represent an image of the Ram at that exact moment [47]. On the other
hand, obtaining the image of the memory from a running full blown system can be
tedious as discussed in Section 2.1.2.1.
Ubuntu is one of the most used distributions of Linux; version 10.10 (also called
Maverick Meerkat) was the latest release at the beginning of our project and is based on
the 2.6.35 kernel.
The size of the RAM was chosen to avoid the complexities that a ZONE_HIGHMEM would
introduce to the virtual to physical address translation (see Section 3.1.2 and [5]), thus it
was kept below 896MB. The size of the virtual hard drive was chosen arbitrarily, but we
opted for no swap space. The swapping mechanism uses some preconfigured space on
disk to extend the available physical memory by moving some pages from the RAM to
the allocated area on hard drive. The complexity associated with this practice will be
ignored.
After building the virtual environment, the next activity involves creating a
process and running it, at which point the VM can be paused and a snapshot taken so that
an image of the memory can be copied. Because the created process serves as basis to the
proof-of-concept implementation and is central to the rest of the experiment, it should be
specially crafted to be simple and flexible. The following source code is the C program
(test.c) that we used to create such a process:
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#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
int main()
{
float i, j;
for (i=0; i<500000; i++)
for(j=0; j<50000; j++);
int fd;
fd = open("sample.txt", O_RDWR|O_CREAT);
write(fd, "Done.\n", 6);
close(fd);
return 0;
}

This program executes a nested for loop, then opens a file called sample.txt (creates it
if it does not exist) in which it writes the string “Done.”. The file is then closed and the
program exited. The purpose of the nested for loop is to give us enough time to take a
snapshot of the VM and even get some information about the process for verification
purposes in future stages. The constant values were chosen to ensure that the wait time
was sufficient. A simple call to the sleep() function would have been more predictable,
unfortunately returning from system calls during the resumption phase is problematic
(see Chapter 5).
Following is the source code to a second C program (test2.c) on which the
experiment was also performed. This program was designed to verify if data (variables in
this case) are preserved through the procedure:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
int main()
{
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float i, j;
int fd, value;
char buf[5];
int k=4;
static char dec[] = "0123456789";
value = 12 + 32;
for (i=0; i<500000; i++)
for (j=0; j<50000; j++);
value += j;
do {

/* Implementation of itoa()* /
buf[k--] = dec[value%10];
value /= 10;
} while(value);
fd = open("sample.txt", O_RDWR|O_CREAT);
write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
write(fd, "\nDone.\n", 8);
close(fd);
return 0;
}

The variable value is modified before and after the nested loop is executed, and the final
value (50044) is to be printed into the ―sample.txt‖ file. The do..while statement is
used to convert value into a string buffer to be written in the output file.
Both test.c and test2.c were compiled using the following gcc commands
(which imply the default level of optimization - level 0):
gcc –Wall –o test test.c
gcc –Wall –o test2 test2.c

The binaries were then run, a snapshot of the VM was taken while the nested loop was
being executed and the memory images collected.
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4.2. Extracting Process Information

When an investigator is provided with a snapshot of memory for analysis, after
ensuring the integrity and preservation of the image, there are a number of activities that
she or he can perform, using the tools and methods described in Section 2.3., to obtain
information about the state of the machine at acquisition time. The following is a general
sequence of steps that can be followed in case the examiner wishes to retrieve processspecific data from an image of RAM in order to resume its execution. For each of these
steps, we will also present and explain how they were applied to the memory image and
the test and test2 processes of Section 4.1 by the tool gettsk. Written in Python,
gettsk takes as input the image file and the task‘s process ID and produces the artifacts

related to the specified process (The source code for Gettsk is included in Appendix C).

4.2.1. Identifying the Process to be Saved
The first activity is concerned with determining what processes were running on
the machine at the moment of acquisition of the RAM, and choosing among them which
one might be of interest. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the Linux kernel maintains a
circular doubly linked list of all the processes loaded in memory. Therefore, by traversing
the structure, we can obtain the list of running tasks. One of the difficulties here lies on
finding a starting point. There are two approaches to solve this issue:
-

If the filesystem of the machine is available, the address of the process
descriptor (Section 3.2.1) for the swapper process can be retrieved from the
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kernel symbol table file /boot/System.map-x (‗x‘ being the kernel version)
[46].
-

If the investigator does not have access to files, it is still possible to find the
address of the task_struct of the swapper process, by combining search
and known facts about the way Linux manages the memory. For example,
one can start with searching the image for strings such as ―swapper‖ or
―init‖ (first two kernel tasks, that are always running on a well-functioning
Linux system), then use the fact that their PID is respectively 0 and 1 and that
every kernel address is greater than PAGE_OFFSET (equivalent of
0xC0000000)

to build a heuristic algorithm that would find the address to a

process‘ task_struct as well as offsets to some of its fields.
For the purpose of our study, we used the filesystem of the virtual machine, specifically
the file /boot/System.map-2.6.35-22-generic to read the linear kernel address of the
init_task: 0xc07c76e0.
PAGE_OFFSET

The actual address in memory is obtained by subtracting

(see Section 3.1.2).

Having the starting point is not enough for the traversal; we need to be able to
move from one task to the next. The kernel uses the tasks field of the process descriptor
for each process to link it to its neighbors in the list.
The offsets to fields in kernel data structures are derived manually by navigating through
the source code for the structure, accounting for the size of each field (taking into
consideration the storage size of basic types, for example one byte for long and pointers,
etc…). Automating the computation of these offsets is problematic because of C
preprocessor conditional groups defined in the kernel source code. For example, #ifdef
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statements are common and add or remove fields to kernel structures depending on
certain macros. However, the value of these macros cannot be obtained from the RAM
image alone.
Using this procedure, the offsets for the tasks, comm and pid fields of the task_struct
can be found and used to walkthrough and list the processes running on the machine from
the memory image (Appendix A contains all the offsets used during our experiment;
these values are very specific to our environment and apply only to the kernel version
2.6.35.22). This is exactly what the program ps.py (whose Python source code is in
Appendix B) does on our proof-of-concept image.

4.2.2. Retrieving the Process’ Artifacts and Metadata
The previous subsection explains how to obtain the list of running processes from
the memory image. The investigator can now identify a specific task that could be of
interest to the case and proceed to extract the data related to that process from the RAM.

General Information:
These refer to the data that is used for identification or to determine the basic status of the
process and include:
-

The Process ID: Integer value uniquely assigned to tasks running on a
machine. It is mainly used for identification purposes. It is the pid field of the
task_struct

for the process. It is passed as input to the gettsk tool.

49
-

The Process’ name: String also used for identification, excluding the
execution path. It is the comm field of the process descriptor. In our illustrative
examples, ―test‖ and ―test2‖ would represent the name.

-

The Execution State: The field state of the task_struct describes the
running status of the program. If the value is negative, the process is
unrunnable, runnable/running if it‘s 0, or can take the values showed in Fig.
9.
include/linux/sched.h

182
183
184
185
186
...
191
192
193
194

#define
#define
#define
#define
#define

TASK_RUNNING
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE
__TASK_STOPPED
__TASK_TRACED

0
1
2
4
8

#define
#define
#define
#define

TASK_DEAD
TASK_WAKEKILL
TASK_WAKING
TASK_STATE_MAX

64
128
256
512

Figure 9. Possible values of the execution state

-

Process Flags: Provide more details on the status of the task. They can take a
wide range of values such as PF_STARTING when the process is being created,
PF_KTHREAD

for kernel threads, PF_VCPU if run on a virtual CPU or

PF_SUPERPRIV

if used super-user privileges. The list of all the possible

options can be found in include/linux/sched.h.
-

Process Credentials: As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, they refer to permissions
associated with the process. A pointer to a cred structure can be found in the
task_struct.

We can thus obtain the pairs (UID, GID), (SUID, SGID),

50
(EUID, EGID)

and (FSUID, FSGID) which denote the real, saved, effective

and filesystem-related user and group ID.

The following table summarizes what general information does the gettsk tool extract,
as well as actual values for our test and test2 processes when statically compiled
(More in Section 5.2.3).

Metadata

Data Structures

Fields

Values for

Values for

test.c

test2.c

ID

task_struct

pid

21526

14475

Name

task_struct

comm

test

test2

State

task_struct

state

0

0

Flags

task_struct

flags

0x00000078 0x00000078

Credentials

cred

uid,

gid,

1000

(same 1000

(same

euid,

egid,

value for all of

value for all of

suid,

sgid,

them)

them)

fsuid,
fsgid

Table 1. General Information extracted by gettsk

Process Address Space:
The memory segments and mappings are core components to Linux processes. We first
collect structural information from the memory descriptor, that is, start and end virtual
addresses to memory segments (code, data, stack, heap, arguments and environment
variables). They can be found in the mm_struct of the process.
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To ease the collection of data from memory, Gettsk implements a generic data structure
(called Structure) to mimic the different structures used by the Linux kernel to maintain
process information:
class Structure:
def __init__(self, **kwds):
self.__dict__.update(kwds)
def __str__(self):
state = ["%s = 0x%08x" % (att, value)
for (att, value)
in self.__dict__.items()]
return '\n'.join(state)

For example, the following vmstruct is used to store information from the memory
descriptor of a process in the kernel.

vmstruct = Structure(start_code, end_code,
start_data, end_data, start_brk, brk,
arg_start, arg_end, start_stack,
env_start, env_end)

Using the starting address of the task_struct and the configured offsets, gettsk can
access the data in the RAM image and copy them into the built structures .
Next, we extract the memory regions‘ metadata and their contents. The Linux
kernel maintains a linked list, sorted by starting virtual address, to keep track of memory
areas. The memory descriptor of each process has a field mmap of type vm_area_struct
that points to the first element of the list of regions. Each vm_area_struct or region
descriptor has a field vm_next pointing the current area to the next (and a field vm_prev
pointing to the previous). These can be used to navigate the list of region and extract the
self-descriptive data for each: vm_start, vm_end, vm_prot, vm_flags, vm_pgoff
and vm_file defined in Section 3.2.2. In case the value of vm_file is not null, it points
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to a file structure from which the pathname of the file can be obtained (refer to Section
3.2.3).
For anonymous memory areas, that is, regions that are not mapped to a file on disk
(vm_file is null), gettsk dumps their contents, page by page, from the memory image.
This is done by following the following pseudo-algorithm, where PAGE_SIZE represents
the size of a page frame (4KB on x86 Linux systems):

start
vaddress =

vm_start

while (vaddress <= vm_end )
Convert vaddress to physical address
Dump page at physical address
vaddress = vaddress + PAGE_SIZE
end

Machine-dependent data:
The CPU registers associated with the running task also have to be saved, as they
are part of the process state when it is paused. When performing context switching, the
Linux kernel saves the values of the general registers at the bottom of the Kernel Mode
Stack of the process [3]. In older versions of Linux, the location of task_struct was
always right below the Kernel Mode Stack of the process, so the register set could be
obtained using the following formula (in the case of a 8KB kernel stack, with p
representing the address of the process descriptor) [52]:
struct pt_regs *regs = ((struct pt_regs *)(2*PAGE_SIZE + (unsigned long)p)) – 1.
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However, this setup posed a security risk, so, since version 2.6, the Kernel Mode Stack is
randomly allocated. Luckily, the kernel stores its address in memory. Indeed, the field
thread.sp0,

where thread is a field of task_struct (of type thread_struct -

structure storing CPU specific data for the process), contains a pointer to the bottom of
the Kernel Mode stack right where the register set is saved.
For 32-bit Linux Kernel 2.6 systems, the register set structure (pt_regs) is defined in the
source code as follows (location arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h):
struct pt_regs {
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
unsigned
};

long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long

bx;
cx;
dx;
si;
di;
bp;
ax;
ds;
es;
fs;
gs;
orig_ax;
ip;
cs;
flags;
sp;
ss;

The size of this structure is 68 bytes (8 * 17 fields) and thus, the following formula can
be used to obtain the registers set (See Fig. 10):
struct pt_regs *regs = ((struct pt_regs *)((unsigned long)(p->thread.sp0) - 68)

With the address of the top of the Kernel Mode Stack, gettsk copies the process
registers in a byte stream.
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Low Addresses
task_struct
thread.sp0

Kernel
Mode Stack

68 bytes
register
set

High Addresses

Figure 10. Finding the Process Register Set

Filesystem information:
The interaction between tasks and the filesystem is fundamental to the functioning
of a computing system. In Linux, files can be of different types: Regular named files,
directories, symbolic links, device files, sockets or pipes.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the kernel manages an array of file descriptor numbers
(integers uniquely associated with files used by a task), through the file descriptor table,
that keeps track of all the files currently opened by the process. Each file descriptor
number refers to a structure of type file (see Fig. 8), which holds data about the file in
question and its relationship with the process.
The tool gettsk does not fully support extracting filesystem information from memory.
It only collects the pathname of regular files on disk and does not deal with either pipes
or sockets (See Section 4.3).

Child Processes Information:
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It is possible that the process to be extracted had child processes also running on
the machine. The kernel keeps track of all the children of a process through a circular
doubly linked list accessed through the children field of the task_struct. Their
information should also be retrieved and their hierarchy (child processes might also have
children) preserved. It would allow investigators to have a more accurate depiction of
their effects on the system resources, as well as the communication between them.
Because each of the threads in the hierarchy also has their execution state saved in
memory, the procedure described so far to retrieve information about a task can be
repeated for all the threads and saved in a tree-like structure.
Gettsk

does not support retrieving child processes data. This is not problematic for our

proof-of-concept since out test and test2 processes do not have child processes.

4.3. Saving the Obtained Results

All the artifacts extracted in the previous steps are to be saved in a simple,
efficient and portable format. Indeed, the size of the information collected can be
considerable, especially if the contents of memory regions are dumped. Also, it should be
simple enough for the investigators to be able to decipher the data and find evidence. One
of the goals of our exercise is to determine if it is possible to resume the execution of the
saved process, potentially on a different host. Therefore, the requirement that the output
should be portable plays a special role in these circumstances.
The Gettsk tool organizes the retrieved data in an XML (eXtensible Markup Language)
file. The XML language was chosen because it is standardized widely supported and
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defines rules for building files that are both human and machine readable. Moreover, it is
customizable, as users can construct and implement specific formats that valid files have
to follow: they are called schemas. Appendix D contains the XML schema (defined using
XML Schema Definition or XSD language) used by gettsk to store the recovered data.
The following is an excerpt of the resulting file for out test process, displaying how the
name, pid, credentials and register set are stored:

<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<process arch="x86" kernel_version="2.6.35" magic_number="FFC0">
<pid>
21526
</pid>
<name>
test
</name>
<state>
0
</state>
<flags>
0x00000078
<flags/>
<credentials egid="1000" euid="1000" fsgid="1000" fsuid="1000" gid="1000"
sgid="1000" suid="1000" uid="1000"/>
<reg_set encoding="binary-base64">
AAAAAMQhnL9QIZy/AGmeR8CJBAgoIZy/AQAAAHsAAAB7AAAAAAAAADMAAAAQ////74IECHMAA
AACAgAAACGcv3sAAAAAAAAA
</reg_set>

For binary streams that are dumped in the output, such as CPU registers or the contents of
memory areas, base64 encoding is used to transform the data in textual form. This was
used first to accommodate XML standards that require the use of Unicode encoding.
Base64

is also a very common encoding/decoding scheme widely used to transfer data on

the Internet.
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4.4. Limitations of Gettsk

The gettsk implementation described in the previous section is developed as a
proof-of-context for extracting process information from an image of RAM. There are
still a lot of unexplored or unsupported features that could be of interest to an
investigator. They include:
-

Determining offsets to fields of kernel structures in memory: This is probably
the most important issue the tool still faces. The offsets and configurations
displayed in Appendix A were obtained by hand and are specific to a version
of the Linux Kernel. Therefore, for an investigator to use this tool on another
Linux platform, these values have to be reexamined and reevaluated. This
shortcoming is tied to the fact that the tool does not have much room for
extension to different versions of the kernel.

-

Files: We mentioned in Section 4.2.2 that gettsk does not support extracting
information about pipes and sockets (although they might contain knowledge
valuable to investigators such as external IP addresses and/or inter-process
communication data). They require information about other processes or
external entities that we could not obtain (although they may exist) from the
memory image. For files on disk, only their pathnames is saved to allow the
investigator to at least have a list, which can be examined further for potential
evidence. Our proof-of-concept processes do not have any open file, therefore
the outcome of our experiment is not compromised, but in case a task of
interest has open files, more information about them should be extracted
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including the file descriptor number, the current position in the file, its
permissions and open mode (read, write, etc…). To prepare for the
resumption phase, these files should be packaged together with the XML
output file and transported to the host machine.
-

Process Hierarchy: Gettsk also does not store any information about parent
and child processes. In an ideal situation, every task that is linked to the
process passed as input should be extracted and saved following the same
hierarchy (i.e. with details about their relationships with each other).

-

Processes executing a system call: It is possible that at the moment the RAM
was collected, a process of interest was waiting on a system call (this would
have been the case for our test process if the sleep() system call was used,
refer to Section 4.1). In such a case, in addition to the process information,
the state of the kernel should be captured. Gettsk does not explore this
option.

-

Inter-Process Communication (IPC): Tasks often cooperate with each other
through techniques such as message passing, synchronization or Remote
Procedure Calls (RPC). In this Chapter, apart from sockets for networking
and pipes, we did not discuss what other kernel objects are required to
perform IPC. They include signals, message queues, held semaphores, shared
memory metadata and of course the other processes involved in the
transactions.

5. RESUMING THE EXECUTION OF AN EXTRACTED PROCESS (MEMEXEC)

We have successfully extracted process information from an image of the RAM
of a Linux system. We now focus on the question of whether it is possible to resume the
execution of the task using the data collected. It turns out that under certain
circumstances the answer is affirmative. This chapter will first describe what type of
configuration is required from the machine in which the resumption will occur, and then
will follow a discussion on how this can be actually be performed. A tool, memexec built
to implement these recommendations on our proof-of-concept experiment will also be
presented and explained, as well as its results and limitations.

5.1. Requirements and Design Options

Earlier in this thesis, we mentioned the need for the environment in which
malware analysis is performed to be contained. This is one of the main pillars of our
approach to resume a process obtained from a memory image. However, the process
cannot just be transported onto any machine and revived; there is a very good chance that
it will not work at all. To ensure that the resources and configurations are the ones
expected by the task, the host should be as close as possible to the initial system. Ideally,
the machine from which the RAM was acquired would be the primary choice for
resumption. Unfortunately, it is usually a production system which might be
compromised in an unknown manner, and thus is susceptible to produce manipulated
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evidence, misguide the investigator and/or propagate malware to other computers. The
following are some of the most important configurations that the host machine should
have:
-

The underlying hardware of the host must be the same as the original.
Processes are built and compiled for a specific machine and are highly
dependent on the CPU architecture.

-

Similarly, it is preferable for the operating system of the receiving machine to
match with the initial computer. However, this requirement is weaker than
the restriction on the hardware: It is possible that the resumption process will
work on different versions of the same operating system, especially for Linux
if they are from the same patch level (version 2.6.34 and 2.6.35 for example)
or if the new kernel is a recompile of the original.

-

Unless it was (or will be) used by the saved process, a file on disk does not
need to be replicated in the host machine. However, because the pathname of
opened and mapped files depend on the filesystem of the original machine
(root directory and current working directory), it might be necessary for some
files to exist in specific locations. It is possible to work around this
requirement, by manually renaming the files.

-

Similarly to files on disk, the users and groups existing in the original system
are not necessary to the resumption of the task. But, in case the owner of the
initial process needs to be restored, the permissions of the user/group in
question should be the same in the two machines, especially on resources
accessed by the saved task.
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After the data has been extracted from the memory image and the receiving
machine is adequately configured, the resumption can begin. The general idea behind
resuming the execution of a process involves moving the saved information into the
appropriate locations and launching its execution. For the Linux kernel, this activity can
be performed either from User Space or from Kernel Space.
From User Space, this can be achieved by using the tracing capabilities of Linux (with
the ptrace() call for example) and other system calls such as mmap() to recreate
memory mappings or file operations (open(), write(), etc…) for opened files. This
would allow for a cross-version solution, since most system calls are kept across kernel
changes. This method might work for very simple processes, but issues will quickly arise
for more complex tasks, as system calls do not permit users to change specific values in
kernel data structures, which might be desirable or required in some cases. Furthermore,
it would be difficult to modify some process metadata such as name, pid or execution
state from user space without hacking the kernel.
The alternative solution involves restoring the saved artifacts while running in kernel
mode. This gives direct access to kernel data structures and thus all the changes necessary
for process resumption can be made. However, this technique is very kernel-dependent,
thus the solution might not work in different kernel versions. Here, two options are
available: Either patch the kernel or use a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM). Patching the
kernel implies creation of new system calls and/or modification of existing kernel code
that would allow the user to carry out their task. The kernel has to be recompiled and the
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machine restarted every time a new functionality has to be added or modified, which can
become problematic and cumbersome for large project.
Using a loadable kernel module offers more flexibility and is much easier on the
developer. Indeed, a kernel module is a set of functionalities that can be added and
removed from the kernel (using the insmod and rmmod commands respectively) without
rebuilding it. They are particularly useful when creating drivers for devices and adding
them to the kernel.
The kernel module approach is the one used for our experiment and the toolset memexec
includes the memlkm program implementing a pseudo device driver (/dev/memexec),
which will permit us to execute customized code in kernel mode.

5.2. Restoring Process Artifacts
5.2.1. General Methodology
In Section 4.2, we described ways to retrieve information about a running process
from memory and prepare a package that would help reconstruct the extracted process
and resume its execution on a similar environment. We now discuss how to achieve such
reconstruction. Two basic methods can be considered here:

- Create a new kernel task from scratch containing only information from the
saved process and launch its execution.

- Use a process already running on the host and modify its behavior and
artifacts to mimic the saved process.
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The first approach is similar to the proposal made by Ilo [28] (see Section 2.4),
which involves building a process from the ground up (implies creating a new
task_struct

and a new address space), insert data saved during the extraction stage and

schedule its execution. This would be ideal from a forensic perspective, given that all the
information about the revived process will be known to the investigator. But, this turns
out to be a daunting task without the help of the operating system because it requires
accounting for every single kernel structure and performing the appropriate initialization
for each of them. If even one variable or structure is not correctly instantiated, a system
crash or an unwanted behavior can happen.
The second method on the other hand, is closer to the restart component of the CRAK
process migration tool [48], where the program that parses the ―checkpoint‖ file (file
containing information about a saved process) is the one being modified to resemble the
original task. This approach is simple since the operating system already built the
foundation for the preexisting process and so, only the insertion of saved information
(such as memory regions and the register set) is to be performed. However, artifacts
associated with the modified task remain in memory and might have effects on the
resumed task. But, since the process is chosen, its impact is known to the investigator.
This method is the one used during our experiment.
The following steps give a general overview of what activities should be done to
resume the execution context of a saved process:
1. Create a new process: This is optional depending on the method used.
2. Modify the process to insert information gathered from memory.
3. Launch the execution.
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The next subsections will illustrate how these activities were achieved during our proofof-concept experiment, giving details on the inner-workings of the memexec toolset.

5.2.2. Implementation (Memexec)
Memexec,

written in C (see Appendix E), is divided in two components: a loadable

kernel module (memlkm) that will be used to restore the artifacts of the saved process and
a User Space program that parses the input files and launches the kernel mode operations.
After the kernel module is loaded into the system, memexec takes as input an XML file
following the format described in Chapter 4, and performs the following activities:

1. Parsing the XML file into data variables
Using the libxml2 library (see Makefile in Appendix E), the input file is parsed
and the information is saved in a memproc data structure, storing all the process artifacts
contained in the file. The structure is defined as follows:
struct memproc {
unsigned long old_pid, state; /* PID and state */
int flags;
/* Process Flags */
int seg_num;
/* Number of Segments */
int file_num;
/* Number of Open Files */
char * regs;
/* Bytes holding the register set */
char name[16];
/* Name */
struct credentials memcred;
/* process user credentials */
struct vmstruct vm_map;
/* Memory descriptor info */
struct segments * seglist;
/* Memory regions */
struct open_file * filelist; /* List of open files */
struct signals sig;
};
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It is also at this stage that the base64 encoded data in the XML input file is transformed
back into binary streams.

2. Switching to Kernel Mode and restoring extracted artifacts
After parsing the data from the XML file, the next step involves rebuilding the
saved process. Memexec then opens the device file /dev/memexec and through the
device‘s Input/Output Control (ioctl), it can execute kernel mode instructions. The
variable of type memproc containing the saved information is passed to the ioctl call. As
we mentioned earlier, the tool does not create a new process, rather it modifies the
program used to open the device file (also called memexec in our case). Next the task‘s
metadata is restored as follows:

General Information:
When in Kernel Mode, the address of the task_struct of the currently running
process can be obtained using the macro current. Therefore it is simple to access and
replace fields of the process descriptor. For example, the name of the process (which is
the comm field of task_struct) is accessed with: current->comm.
Therefore, the name, process flags and execution state can all be restored by replacing the
value appropriate fields in the process descriptor by the corresponding data from the
saved process.
Concerning the process ID, the saved value must not be in use in the current system and
must not be larger than a maximum (can be found in /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max).
Thus, before the PID is replaced, some tests for availability must be made. Memexec does
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not support restoring the PID of the process. This does not affect the resumption of our
test

and test2 processes, but it might be problematic to a forensic investigation if the

task of interest uses its PID during its execution.
We mentioned in Section 5.1 that if the credentials associated with the task extracted
from memory should be restored, the corresponding users and groups (at least their IDs)
must exist on the host machine and have the same privileges on the resources used by the
resumed process. If this is satisfied, a new credentials data structure can be created with
the values obtained from the extracted process. Memexec does not support restoring the
credentials.

Process Address Space:
First we have to restore the virtual memory structure. Each segment attribute has
to be replaced with its saved counterpart. The memory descriptor of the process can be
directly accessed through the mm field of the process descriptor. Therefore, the following
line of code will successfully change the address of the beginning of the code section for
the process (tmp holds vm_struct data for the current region as defined in Section
4.2.2). This can be repeated with the other segments to reconstitute the virtual memory
structure of the saved task:
current->mm->start_code

= tmp.start_code;

Each memory area is either mapped to a file or anonymously. In the first case, the
region can be restored by remapping the file in question. Of course, the requirement that
files on disk to be restored must exist on the host machine (see below and Section 5.1)
applies in this case. The following code carries out the task, using the kernel function
do_mmap_pgoff():
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do_mmap_pgoff(f, vm_start, size, mmap_prot, mmap_flags, pgoff);

The argument f is of type file *, and represents the file to be mapped; vmstart is the
saved stating virtual address for the region; size is the amount of space to be mapped
(obtained by subtracting the saved start virtual address from the end address of the
memory area); mmap_prot designates the protection flags for the frames of the region;
mmap_flags

specify what kind of region is mapped (for example, because stack regions

grow downwards, the macro VM_GROWSDOWN is used); pgoff is the offset at which the file
should be mapped.
For anonymously mapped regions, the do_mmap() kernel function first allocates the
needed amount of space, then the contents of the original memory area can be copied into
the reserved space using the function copy_to_user() (This function permits to copy
data from kernel space into a virtual memory location of the current process).
Memexec

creates these new mappings without getting rid of the existing ones on

the task being modified. Every time this was attempted, the process was killed by the
Operating System. Thus the memory regions of the modified process are still present in
memory after the address space is restored, except those that occupied virtual addresses
used by the extracted process (they were replaced by memexec).

CPU Registers:
The Linux kernel provides a convenient function to locate the register set (from the
kernel mode stack) of the currently running process: task_pt_regs(current), defined
in the source file arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h. Thus, the following lines of C
code will be enough to restore the CPU registers:
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struct pt_regs * regs;
regs = task_pt_regs(current);
*regs = *tmp;

// tmp is a pointer to the saved registers

Filesystem and Child Process Information:
To recover the file table of the process extracted from a RAM image, all the
regular files must be reopened on the host machine and their position pointer moved to
the saved location. More importantly, because it is used by the task to refer to the file,
their file descriptor number must be restored as well. This can be done either by using
both the open() and dup() system call from User Space or by directly manipulating the
file table data structure in kernel mode [52].
As we mentioned in Section 5.1, the file in question must exist on the new system and
have the same pathname and permissions as in the initial machine. If for some reason the
pathname requirement is not an option (for example, subdirectories might not exist or
security concerns might exist), the investigator can manually change the location of the
file in the input data to suit his configurations.
Our experimental tool memexec does not support restoring the file table. Also, pipes and
sockets were not explored: they imply communications with other processes or other
machines, while our study was focused on the extraction and resumption of a single
process.
Similarly, reviving a group of potentially related tasks is not included in our proof-ofconcept. Therefore child processes were not considered. The general idea behind
resuming the execution of a group of processes involves resuming each thread separately
and reconstructing the links between them through kernel objects (parents, siblings,
and children fields of the task_struct for example).
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5.2.3. Results
After the process artifacts are restored, the kernel module can exit and yield the
execution back to User Space. At this point, the next instruction will be fetched from the
Instruction Pointer register and executed in the new context, which in theory will resume
the execution of the original process in the new host.
During our experiment, the process was successfully revived. Indeed, when memlkm
returned with no errors, rather than the next instruction of memexec (closing the device
file), the nested loop in our test and test2 processes was executed.
The rest of the program behaved differently depending on the initial compilation method:

5.2.3.1 Results for Dynamic Compilation:
In our first attempt at the experiment, the test program was compiled
dynamically, the RAM acquired, the metadata of the test extracted with gettsk and the
process resumed.
In the original machine, while the nested loop of test process was being executed, we
were able to print its memory mappings using the Linux‘s /proc pseudo-filesystem as
seen in Fig. 11.
The top 4 lines on the picture represent the last lines of a ps command run on the system
to get the PID of test; then the /proc/PID/maps command was run to display the
mappings. The first column in the output represents the start and end virtual addresses
used by the region. The second shows the set of permissions associated with frames of
the area (read, write, execute and private). The third column is the offset in the file (if
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any). The last three are respectively the device major and minor, the inode and the
pathname of the file mapped, if any.

Figure 11. Original Mappings for the Dynamically Compiled test Program

The same procedure was repeated when the process was resumed and it resulted in Figure
12. The bold lines show the mappings restored from the original test process. The other
mappings are associated with the process launched by memexec that were not deleted.
This picture also demonstrates that the name of the process was successfully modified.
Unfortunately, after the nested loop, the process threw a segmentation fault while
executing the open() function. We later discovered that every instruction that did not
involve a system call can be successfully run, suggesting that the problem was associated
with the dynamic linking of the shared libraries. We therefore opted to do the same
experiment with a statically compiled binary.
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airness@ubuntu:~/Desktop/Code/Memexec$ ps aux | grep test
airness 17908 0.0 0.2
5192 1280 pts/0
D+
07:14
airness 17912 0.0 0.1
4012
760 pts/1
S+
07:14

0:00 ./test
0:00 grep test

airness@ubuntu:~/Desktop/Code/Memexec$ sudo cat /proc/17908/maps
00110000-00112000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 921753
/lib/libdl-2.12.1.so
00112000-00269000
r-xp 00000000
08:01 921748
/lib/libc-2.12.1.so
0026a000-0026c000
r--p 00157000
08:01 921748
/lib/libc-2.12.1.so
0026c000-0026d000
rw-p 00159000
08:01 921748
/lib/libc-2.12.1.so
0026d000-00270000
rw-p 00000000
00:00 0
[heap]
00610000-00767000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 921748
/lib/libc-2.12.1.so
00767000-00768000 ---p 00157000 08:01 921748
/lib/libc-2.12.1.so
00768000-0076a000 r--p 00157000 08:01 921748
/lib/libc-2.12.1.so
0076a000-0076b000 rw-p 00159000 08:01 921748
/lib/libc-2.12.1.so
0076b000-0076e000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
[heap]
00823000-00847000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 921756
/lib/libm-2.12.1.so
00847000-00848000 r--p 00023000 08:01 921756
/lib/libm-2.12.1.so
00848000-00849000 rw-p 00024000 08:01 921756
/lib/libm-2.12.1.so
00974000-00990000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 921741
/lib/ld-2.12.1.so
00990000-00991000 r--p 0001b000 08:01 921741
/lib/ld-2.12.1.so
00991000-00992000 rw-p 0001c000 08:01 921741
/lib/ld-2.12.1.so
00b58000-00b59000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0
[vdso]
00d2f000-00d42000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 917700
/lib/libz.so.1.2.3.4
00d42000-00d43000 r--p 00012000 08:01 917700
/lib/libz.so.1.2.3.4
00d43000-00d44000 rw-p 00013000 08:01 917700
/lib/libz.so.1.2.3.4
00d82000-00ea4000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 1050096
/usr/lib/libxml2.so.2.7.7
00ea4000-00ea8000 r--p 00121000 08:01 1050096
/usr/lib/libxml2.so.2.7.7
00ea8000-00ea9000 rw-p 00125000 08:01 1050096
/usr/lib/libxml2.so.2.7.7
00ea9000-00eaa000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
[heap]
00f01000-00f1d000
r-xp 00000000
08:01 921741
/lib/ld-2.12.1.so
00f1d000-00f1e000
r--p 0001b000
08:01 921741
/lib/ld-2.12.1.so
00f1e000-00f1f000
rw-p 0001c000
08:01 921741
/lib/ld-2.12.1.so
00fae000-00faf000
rwxp 00000000
00:00 0
[heap]
08048000-08049000
r-xp 00000000
08:01 919388
/home/airness/Desktop/test
08049000-0804a000
r--p
00000000
08:01 919388
/home/airness/Desktop/test
0804a000-0804b000
rw-p 00001000
08:01 919388
/home/airness/Desktop/test
0804b000-0804c000 r--p 00002000 08:01 541910
/home/airness/Desktop/Code/Memexec/memexec
0804c000-0804d000 rw-p 00003000 08:01 541910
/home/airness/Desktop/Code/Memexec/memexec
09b00000-09b63000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
[heap]
b7713000-b7714000
rw-p 00000000
00:00 0
b7721000-b7723000
rw-p 00000000
00:00 0
b77c4000-b77c6000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
b77d2000-b77d5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
bfc4a000-bfc6b000
rw-p 00000000
00:00 0
[stack]
bfdf2000-bfe13000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0

Figure 12. Restored Mappings for the Dynamically Compiled test Process

5.2.3.2 Results for Static Compilation:
When a program is built statically, the needed libraries are merged into the binary
which thus becomes a standalone executable. The resulting binary is obviously larger
than its dynamic counterpart, but the dynamic loading mechanism is removed. Thus, the
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memory mappings do not include shared libraries anymore (see Fig. 13 for the mappings
of a test process run after a static compilation).

Figure 13. Original Mappings for the Statically Compiled test Process

With a statically compiled test process, the resumption procedure worked correctly.
Indeed, all the instructions following the nested loop were successfully executed: the file
―sample.txt‖ was created and the string ―Done.‖ written into the file.
Similarly, for the test2 example, the resumption worked and the correct value (50044)
stored in the value variable was also printed into the output file, demonstrating that
program data were successfully preserved the procedure.
The only hiatus happened when the task was being terminated. The following errors were
displayed for the test process (a similar message was output for the test2 task):
*** glibc detected *** ./test: free(): invalid pointer: 0x080cee20 ***
Segmentation fault

This error message is usually thrown when an unallocated resource is being deleted,
suggesting that this might be a consequence to the data of the memexec process still
remaining in memory.
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5.2.4. Limitations of Memexec
Although memexec illustrates that it is possible to revive a process extracted from
an image of memory, there are restrictions, unsupported features and unexplored
possibilities still associated with this work. Some of them are listed below:

- Dealing with dynamic loading: The fact that memexec fails to execute system
calls at the resumption phase when the program is dynamically compiled is an
important shortcoming. Investigators will be faced, more often than not, with
dynamically-linked malware which are bound to make system calls to access
resources.

- Deleting unused data from the memexec process: As mentioned in Section 5.2,
the memory mappings of the process being modified by memexec are not all
expunged and their effects on the final result are unknown. This may be
problematic to a forensic investigation, as the evidence discovered using our
method might be rejected in court.

- Unsupported process artifacts: A number of process information is not
restored the tool such as open files, pipes and sockets, process ID, user
credentials and child processes data.

- Restrictions on the host system: The requirements that the host machine
should have, as described in Section 5.1, do not give much flexibility to the
investigator. For example, the memexec tool does not provide an alternative to
restoring the memory mappings when the Filesystem is not available, even
though their contents are saved in RAM.

6. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we demonstrated that given an image of the RAM of a Linux
machine, it is possible to extract enough information about a specific running process to
be able to resume its execution on another environment. We also presented two proof-ofconcept tools gettsk and memexec that respectively retrieve process artifacts from the
memory image and use the saved data to revive the program.
Obtaining the memory image of a running machine in the first place is not easy.
Although researchers developed both hardware and software methods to acquire the
RAM, the constantly-changing nature of non-volatile memory pose a challenge to
investigators. However, most virtualization software allows users to take a snapshot of a
virtual machine and collect the contents of the memory from a file on disk. We took
advantage of this feature to create memory images of Linux systems that we used to
perform our experiments.
When the memory image is available, the first step involves identifying which of
the tasks running on the machine, at the moment of capture, is of interest. This is done by
parsing the RAM for the circular doubly-linked list of process descriptors maintained by
the Linux kernel (from which all the other process-related kernel structures can be
obtained as described in Chapter 3), in order to get the list of all the tasks loaded in
memory. At this point, accessing the data is a question of determining the offsets of
specific fields in the kernel data structures. The gettsk tool proceeds to store the
obtained information in a file using the flexible and widely used XML format.
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To be able to resume the process extracted from the RAM, the receiving system
should be prepared adequately (see Section 5.1): the operating system, the underlying
hardware as well as other resources such as the filesystem (especially those used by the
task) should be similar to their equivalent in the original machine, to ensure a proper
continuation of the execution of the task. It is also an imperative that the host be separate
from production systems, so that potential infection is contained.
The actual resumption procedure can be performed in Linux either form User
Space or Kernel Space, but making changes while in kernel mode allows direct access to
the data structures that need to be restored for the execution to continue. That‘s the reason
why the memexec toolset includes a loadable kernel module (memlkm) which does the
actual work of placing the saved process‘ artifacts in their appropriate locations.
Although our experiment worked for our proof-of-concept configurations, both
tools gettsk and memexec fail to consider some process-related data that could come in
handy for an investigation such as open files and the ability to complete the resumption
when the initial process is dynamically compiled (see Sections 4.4 and 5.2.4). This work
is designed for a single process at the time and thus Inter Process Communications as
well as network connections are not supported. Moreover, the implementation is highly
dependent on the version of the kernel used during the experiment (Linux kernel 2.6.35)
and will not function correctly on different platforms.

Future Work:
Our work described how a number of process-specific information can be
retrieved from a memory image and how they can be used to continue the execution of

76
the task on another host. This will increase the chances for an investigator to discover
and/or consolidate evidence, from a forensic analysis of the contents of the RAM. But as
the previous paragraph suggests, there is still room for improvement, including the
following:

- Dynamically compiled binaries and system calls: As discussed in Sections
5.2.3.1 and 5.2.4, our proposed solution does not work for dynamically
compiled programs, probably due to the remnants of the process being
modified during the resumption phase. This issue might be solved by restoring
the information of the extracted process using a task created from scratch. It is
worth noting that failures specifically occur when system calls are being
executed, which suggest discrepancies with the process‘ libraries and/or the
state of the kernel (which is not extracted by gettsk).

- Extract and restore the files opened by the process: Regular files, network
sockets and pipes (see Section 4.4). This category can also include providing
alternatives to recovering memory mappings. Our proposal requires that the
files mapped in memory be present at the same location in the host system,
but this might be difficult to fulfill, especially for included libraries. Since
their contents are actually stored in RAM, they could be harnessed at the
extraction phase to alleviate the requirement.

- Extend support to groups of tasks, their relationships and transactions
between them: Neither child, sibling, nor parent processes are taken into
account in our project, although they might be of use to a forensic
investigation. Extracting from memory and resuming the execution of a group
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of running processes and their relationships is thus a desirable feature that
could be pursued in the future. Similarly, if the tasks of interest are involved
in inter-process communications, they should be captured and revived with
their transactions preserved.

- Extend support to different kernel versions and different platforms: Both tools
introduced in this document are very kernel-dependent, primarily due to
differences in data structures between versions of the Linux Kernel. A first
step towards solving this issue could be automating the determination of
fields‘ offsets in kernel structures, as discussed in Section 4.4. A more long
term solution could involve a method used by Volatility [50], which allows
the users to create and add profiles for specific kernel versions, thus providing
more flexibility and control to investigators.

APPENDIX A: OFFSETS AND OTHER CONFIGURATIONS

The following Python declarations (config.py) represent the offsets of elements
in the kernel structures used during the experimental phase of this project. It also includes
hard coded configurations such as PAGE_OFFSET and the address of init_task found
in the System.map symbol table.
******************** CONFIG.PY
init_task
= 0xc07c76e0
kernel_start = 0xc0000000
page_size
= 0x1000
page_mask

******************************

# "Swapper" address obtained from System.map
# PAGE_OFFSET
# Size of a Page: 4KB

= 0x00000fff

regs_size
= 68
sig_action_size

= 1280

# size of register set
# size of signal handler structure

"""
***** Task_struct Offsets: see include/linux/sched.h ********
"""
state_offset = 0
stack_offset = 8
flags_offset = 24
task_offset =
comm_offset =
pid_offset
=
mm_offset
=
parent_offset

432
752
508
460
= 524

cred_offset = 724
sp0_offset
= 808
fs_offset
= 908
files_offset = 912
sighand_offset
= 924
sigpending_offset = 952
sigblocked_offset = 928
"""
******
"""

mm_struct Offsets: see include/linux/mm_types.h

mmap_offset
pgd_offset

= 0
= 40

vmstruct_offset
"""
*****

*********

= 124

# Offset for memory mappings of vm structures
# such as start_code, start_data, start_stack, etc...

vm_area_struct Offsets : see include/linux/mm_types.h

*****
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"""
vm_mm_offset = 0
vm_start_offset
vm_end_offset
vm_next_offset
vm_prev_offset
vm_pgprot_offset
vm_pgoff_offset
vm_flags_offset
vm_file_offset

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

4
8
12
16
20
72
20
76

"""
Files_struct, fdtable, file, dentry and inode Offsets:
see: include/linux/fdtable.h
include/linux/fs.h
include/linux/dcache.h
"""
fdt_offset
fd_offset

= 4
= 4

# File Table offset
# Array of file descritpor (fd) offset

dentry_offset

= 12

d_parent_offset
name_len_offset
d_name_offset

= 28
= 36
= 40

# Dentry's parent offset
# Dentry's Name offset

********************** END CONFIG.PY

*************************

APPENDIX B: LISTING RUNNING PROCESSES
Source code in Python of ps.py that lists the running processes from a Linux
kernel 2.6.35 memory dump.
#!/usr/bin/python
import os
import sys
import struct
from config import *

# See Appendix A: config.py

def usage(arg):
print ""
print " Usage: %s <memory_file>" % (os.path.basename(arg))
print ""
def printline(addr, f):
# Print process info
current = addr + pid_offset
f.seek(current)
ret, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
print '%4d'.ljust(10) % ret ,
current = addr + parent_offset
f.seek(current)
ret, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
current = (ret - kernel_start) + pid_offset
f.seek(current)
ret, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
print '%4d'.ljust(10) % ret ,
if (debug):
current = addr + cred_offset
f.seek(current)
current, = (struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)))
current = current - kernel_start + 4
f.seek(current)
print '%4d'.ljust(10) % (struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))),
print '0x%8x'.ljust(15) % (addr + kernel_start),
current = addr + comm_offset
f.seek(current)
print '%16s'.ljust(25) % (f.read(16))
################################ MAIN #################################
debug = 0
line = ""
if (len(sys.argv) != 2):
usage(sys.argv[0])
sys.exit(0)
fields = "PID ".ljust(15) + "PPID".ljust(10)
if (debug):
fields += "PID".ljust(10)
fields += "ADDRESS(Hex)".ljust(20)

# print headings

fields += "NAME".ljust(25)
print fields
init = init_task - kernel_start
dumpfile = open(sys.argv[1], "rb")
current_task = init
printline(current_task, dumpfile)
dumpfile.seek(current_task + task_offset)
val, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
current_task = (val - kernel_start) - task_offset
while (current_task != init):
printline(current_task, dumpfile)
dumpfile.seek(current_task + task_offset)
val, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
current_task = (val - kernel_start) - task_offset
dumpfile.close()

APPENDIX C: GETTSK SOURCE CODE

This is the source code for the gettsk tool, made up of three files (the two files
structures.py

and gettsk.py printed here, plus config.py in Appendix A).

******************** STRUCTURES.PY ******************************
import os
import sys
import struct
from config import *
# from gettsk import *
class Structure:
# Collection of items to simulate kernel structures
def __init__(self, **kwds):
self.__dict__.update(kwds)
def __str__(self):
state = ["%s = 0x%08x" % (att, value)
for (att, value)
in self.__dict__.items()]
return '\n'.join(state)
class AddresSpace:

# mm_struct in Unix

def __init__(self, address):
self.base_addr = address - kernel_start
self.mmap_addr = self.base_addr + mmap_offset
self.pgd_addr = self.base_addr + pgd_offset
def getVmStruct(self, f): # Get vm structure for each Process Address Space
f.seek(self.base_addr + vmstruct_offset)
start_code, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
end_code, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
start_data, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
end_data, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
start_brk, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
brk, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
start_stack, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
arg_start, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
arg_end, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
env_start, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
env_end, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
vmstruct = Structure(start_code = start_code, end_code = end_code,
start_data = start_data, end_data = end_data,
start_brk = start_brk, brk = brk,
arg_start = arg_start, arg_end = arg_end,
start_stack = start_stack,
env_start = env_start, env_end = env_end)
return vmstruct
def getAllVmAreas(self, f):

# A list of all Memory Regions

seglist = []
f.seek(self.mmap_addr)
address, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
vm = VmArea(address)
check_addr = address - kernel_start
vmarea = vm.getVmArea(f)
stop = True
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while stop or vmarea.addr != check_addr :
seglist.append(vmarea)
vm = vm.getNext(f)
if vm == None :
break
vmarea = vm.getVmArea(f)
stop = False
return seglist
def getPgd(self, f):
pgd_addr = self.pgd_addr
f.seek(pgd_addr)
pgd, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
return pgd
class VmArea:

# vm_area_struct in Linux

def __init__(self, address):
self.base_addr = address - kernel_start
self.next = None
self.prev = None
def getNext(self, f):

# Get next VmArea : vm_next

f.seek(self.base_addr + vm_next_offset)
addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
if addr == 0:
return None
self.next = VmArea(addr)
return self.next
def getVmArea(self, f):

# Get a memory region

f.seek(self.base_addr + vm_start_offset)
vm_start, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
vm_end, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
f.seek(self.base_addr + vm_pgprot_offset)
vm_pgprot, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
vm_flags, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
f.seek(self.base_addr + vm_pgoff_offset)
vm_pgoff, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
vm_file, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) # file struct address or None
vmarea = Structure(addr = self.base_addr, vm_start = vm_start,
vm_end = vm_end,
vm_pgprot=vm_pgprot, vm_flags=vm_flags,
vm_pgoff = vm_pgoff,
vm_file=vm_file)
return vmarea

class File:
def __init__(self, address):
self.base_address = address - kernel_start
self.start = None
self.end = None
def getFilePath(self, f):

# Get File path and Name from File Descriptor

filename = ""
f.seek(self.base_address + dentry_offset)
dentry, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
dentry -= kernel_start
f.seek(dentry + d_parent_offset)
parent, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
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f.seek(dentry + name_len_offset)
size, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
name_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
name_addr -= kernel_start
f.seek(name_addr)
name = f.read(size)
if name == "" :
return ""
while name != "/" and name != "anon_inode:":
if filename == "" :
filename = name
else:
filename = name + '/' + filename
if len(filename) > 100:
break
dentry = parent - kernel_start
f.seek(dentry + d_parent_offset)
parent, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
f.seek(dentry + name_len_offset)
size, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
name_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
name_addr -= kernel_start
f.seek(name_addr)
name = f.read(size)
if name == "" or name == "anon_inode:":
return filename
filename = '/' + filename
return filename
def getFilevmAreas(self, seglist):
all vm_Areas

# Return vm_areas of a file from list of

l = []
for vmarea in seglist :
if vmarea.vm_file == (self.base_address + kernel_start) :
l.append(vmarea)
if self.start == None :
self.start = vmarea.vm_start
if self.end == None :
self.end = vm_area.vm_end
if self.start + vmarea.vm_pgoff * page_size > self.end :
self.end = vmarea.vm_end
return l

******************** END STRUCTURES.PY ******************************

*************************** GETTSK.PY ******************************
#!/usr/bin/python
import os
import sys
import struct
import getopt
import base64
from xml.dom.minidom import Document

# For data encoding

from config import *
from structures import *
def usage(arg):
print
print
print
print

" Usage: %s -f <memory_file> [-o <output_file>] [-v] -p <pid>" % (os.path.basename(arg))
""
"
-f <memory_file> : Memory image file."
"
-o <output_file> : XML output file."
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print "
print "
print ""

-v
-p <pid>

def check_options(argv):
v =
p =
f =
out

:
:

Verbose."
PID of process to extract."

# Verify Command Line Options

0
0
""
= "output.xml"

#
#
#
#

verbose
pid
Memory Image File
Output File

o = "hvf:o:p:"
try:
options = getopt.getopt(argv[1:], o)
opts = dict(options[0])
extra = options[1]
if ((len(opts) == 0) or ("-h" in opts)):
usage(argv[0])
sys.exit(0)
if ("-v" in opts):
v = 1
if (not "-f" in opts):
raise Exception("Memory Image File not specified, use -h for help!")
f = opts["-f"]
if (not "-p" in opts):
raise Exception("PID not specified, use -h for help!")
p = int(opts["-p"])
if ("-o" in opts):
if os.path.exists(opts["-o"]):
raise Exception("The output filename already exists!")
out = opts["-o"]
except getopt.GetoptError, error:
print " Error: " + str(error)
usage(argv[0])
sys.exit(0)
except Exception, ex:
print " Error: " + str(ex)
sys.exit(0)
return (v, f, p, out)
def taskByPid(pid, f):

# Returns task_struct address from PID

init = init_task - kernel_start
current_pid = 0
current_task = init
f.seek(current_task + task_offset)
val, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
current_task = (val - kernel_start) - task_offset
f.seek(current_task + pid_offset)
current_pid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
while (current_task != init and current_pid != pid):
f.seek(current_task + task_offset)
val, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
current_task = (val - kernel_start) - task_offset
f.seek(current_task + pid_offset)
current_pid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
if (current_task == init):
return None
return current_task

def getCred(addr, f):

# Retrieve process' credentials;
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# addr = cred address from
task_struct
addr = addr - kernel_start
f.seek(addr + 4)
uid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
gid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
suid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
sgid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
euid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
egid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
fsuid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
fsgid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4))
cred = Structure (uid=uid, gid=gid, suid=suid, sgid=sgid, euid=euid,
egid=egid, fsuid=fsuid, fsgid=fsgid)
return cred

def getOpenFiles(addr, f):

# Returns list of open files from file table

l = []
open_files = []
filename = ""
addr -= kernel_start
f.seek(addr + fdt_offset)
addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
addr -= kernel_start
f.seek(addr + fd_offset)
addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))

# Pointer to File table

# Pointer to array of fds

addr -= kernel_start
f.seek(addr)
addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
while addr != 0 :
l.append(addr)
addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
for addr in l :
"""
f.seek(addr + dentry_offset)
dentry, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
dentry -= kernel_start
"""
file = File(addr)
filename = file.getFilePath(f)
if filename == "" :
continue
# print filename
open_files.append(filename)
return open_files
def getKernelModeStack(addr, f):

# Get Top of stack containing process CPU registers

addr -= kernel_start - 4
f.seek (addr - regs_size)
buf = f.read(regs_size)
# print buf
return buf
def VirtToPhysical(addr, f, pgd) :
Address.

# -4 to include top of stack

# Translate from user mode Virtual to Physical
#
# Returns the triplet (Paget table flags,

Type of page entry, Physical address of frame if any).
#
# The type of page table is:
#
- 0 for a page directory entry
#
- 1 for a page table entry
#
# This is used to rebuild the page tables
correctly.
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ret = ((pgd >> 12) << 12) + (addr >> 22)*4
f.seek(ret - kernel_start)
pgd_entry, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
if (pgd_entry &
#print
#print
return

0b1 != 0b1):
"PGD_ENTRY present flag is 0: Page frame not in memory ",
hex(pgd_entry)
(pgd_entry & 0xfff, 0, 0)

ret = ((pgd_entry >> 12) << 12) + ((addr >> 12) & (1 << 10)-1)*4
f.seek(ret)
pt_entry, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))
if (pt_entry & 0b1 != 0b1):
# Not in Memory
#print "PT_ENTRY present flag is 0: Page frame not in memory "
#print hex(pt_entry)
return (pt_entry & 0xfff, 1, 0)
final = (((pt_entry >> 12) << 12) + (addr & (1 << 12) - 1))
return (pt_entry & 0xfff, 1,final)

def dumpVmArea(vmarea, f, pgd):
NOT USED NOW!!!

# Dump the contents of a memory region,

addr = vmarea.vm_start
dump = ""
i = 0
while addr < vmarea.vm_end :
(flags, page_type, res) = VirtToPhysical(addr, f, pgd)
if (not res):
#print "Page could not be found: start = 0x%08x , end = 0x%08x" %
(vmarea.vm_start, addr)
#print ""
addr += page_size
continue
else :
if (res & page_mask) :
print " Oops! Page address 0x%08x not aligned" % addr
print ""
f.seek(res)
dump += f.read(page_size)
addr += page_size
i += 1
#print i
return (dump, i)

def buildXml(task, output, f):

#

Build XML file from Process Structure

out = open (output, "w")
dirs = 'tsk_files/'
regstring = 'region'
if dump_map:
if not os.path.isdir("./" + dirs):
os.makedirs(dirs)
if not os.path.isdir("./" + dirs):
print "Cannot create \"tsk_files\" directory!! All memory segment related
files will be in current directory!"
#dirs = './'
doc = Document()
proc = doc.createElement("process")
proc.setAttribute("magic_number", MAGIC)
proc.setAttribute("kernel_version", "2.6.35")
proc.setAttribute("arch", "x86")
doc.appendChild(proc)
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old_pid = doc.createElement("old_pid")
proc.appendChild(old_pid)
pid_t = doc.createTextNode(str(task.pid))
old_pid.appendChild(pid_t)
name = doc.createElement("name")
proc.appendChild(name)
comm = doc.createTextNode(task.name)
name.appendChild(comm)
state = doc.createElement("state")
proc.appendChild(state)
state_t = doc.createTextNode(str(task.state))
state.appendChild(state_t)
flags = doc.createElement("flags")
flags.setAttribute("value", "0x%08x" % (task.flags))
proc.appendChild(flags)
cred = doc.createElement("credentials")
proc.appendChild(cred)
for (attr, value) in task.cred.__dict__.items():
cred.setAttribute(attr, "%d" % value)
buf = getKernelModeStack(task.kmstack, f)
#print "%s" %buf
buf = base64.standard_b64encode(buf)
reg_set = doc.createElement("reg_set")
proc.appendChild(reg_set)
reg_set.setAttribute("encoding", "binary-base64")
reg_stack = doc.createTextNode(buf)
reg_set.appendChild(reg_stack)
vmstruct = doc.createElement("vmstruct")
proc.appendChild(vmstruct)
for (attr, value) in task.vmstruct.__dict__.items():
vmstruct.setAttribute(attr, "0x%08x" % value)
############################# seglist
#########################
segments = doc.createElement("segments")
segments.setAttribute("number", "%d" % (len(task.seglist)))
sp = task.sp_addr - kernel_start
count = 0
for vmarea in task.seglist :
pgoff = 0
#name = 'vm%d'%count

# Offset of page in file representing a region.

if dump_map:
regfilename = '%s%s%d'%(dirs, regstring, count)
reg_file = open (regfilename, "w")
#print "%s" %name
region = doc.createElement("vm_region")
region.setAttribute("vm_start", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_start)
region.setAttribute("vm_end", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_end)
region.setAttribute("vm_pgprot", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_pgprot)
region.setAttribute("vm_flags", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_flags)
region.setAttribute("vm_pgoff", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_pgoff)
if dump_map:
region.setAttribute("local_file", "%s" %regfilename)
#(dmp, num) = dumpVmArea(vmarea, f, task.pgd)
addr = vmarea.vm_start
num = 0
if vmarea.vm_file != 0 :
file = File(vmarea.vm_file)
filename = file.getFilePath(f)
region.setAttribute("filename", filename)
while addr < vmarea.vm_end :

# For each frame, Present in memory or not!
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(flgs, ptype, res) = VirtToPhysical(addr, f, pgd)
if (not res):
#print "Page not present in memory: start = 0x%08x , end = 0x%08x" %
(addr, addr+page_size)
present = 0
addr += page_size
continue
#fname = name + '_frame%d'%num
frame = doc.createElement("vm_frame")
frame.setAttribute("vm_start", "0x%08x" % addr)
frame.setAttribute("vm_end", "0x%08x" % (addr + page_size))
frame.setAttribute("flags", "0x%08x" % flgs)
frame.setAttribute("offset", "0x%08x" % pgoff)
#if (ptype):
#
frame.setAttribute("entry_type", "pte")
#else:
#
frame.setAttribute("entry_type", "pgd")
present = 1
if (res & page_mask) :
print " Oops! Page address 0x%08x not aligned!" % addr
f.seek(res)
dmp = f.read(page_size)
if dump_map:
reg_file.seek(pgoff)
reg_file.write(dmp)
if vmarea.vm_file == 0 :
dmp = base64.standard_b64encode(dmp)
frame.setAttribute("encoding", "binary-base64")
mem_contents = doc.createTextNode(dmp)
frame.appendChild(mem_contents)
region.appendChild(frame)
addr += page_size
pgoff += page_size
num += 1
region.setAttribute("num_pages", "%d" % num)
segments.appendChild(region)
count += 1
# break
proc.appendChild(segments)
############################### end seglist

########################

open_files = doc.createElement("open_files")
open_files.setAttribute("Number", "%d" % (len(task.open_files)))
proc.appendChild(open_files)
for p in task.open_files:
var = doc.createElement("file")
var.setAttribute("pathname", p)
open_files.appendChild(var)
signals = doc.createElement("signals")
proc.appendChild(signals)
sig_act = doc.createElement("sig_actions")
sig_act.setAttribute("encoding", "binary-base64")
signals.appendChild(sig_act)
sig_hand_addr = task.sig_actions - kernel_start
f.seek(sig_hand_addr)
buf = f.read(sig_action_size)
buf = base64.standard_b64encode(buf)
sighand = doc.createTextNode(buf)
sig_act.appendChild(sighand)
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blocked = doc.createElement("sig_blocked")
signals.appendChild(blocked)
blocked.setAttribute("value", "0x%016x" % (task.sig_blocked))
pending = doc.createElement("sig_pending")
signals.appendChild(pending)
pending.setAttribute("value", "0x%016x" % (task.sig_pending))
xml = doc.toprettyxml(indent="
out.write(xml)
out.close()

")

return 0

######################################################
#
***** MAIN ********
######################################################
print
print
print
print

#

""
" Gettsk version 0.1 "
" By Ernest Mougoue <mougoued@dukes.jmu.edu>"
""

(verbose, fileString, pid, outString) = check_options(sys.argv)
# print "Test: pid = %d, file = %s, out = %s, verb = %d " % (pid, fileString, outString, verbose)
dump_map = 0

# dump memory mappings to external files?

dumpfile = open(fileString, "rb")
if (pid == 0):
print "Cannot extract \"swapper\", Please choose another process!"
print ""
sys.exit(0)
task_addr = taskByPid(pid, dumpfile)

# Get the address of task_struct

if (task_addr == None):
print "There is no process with PID: %d, Please choose another process!" % pid
print ""
sys.exit(0)
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + comm_offset)
i = 16
comm = ""
read = dumpfile.read(1)
while (i > 0) and (read != "\x00"):
comm += read
read = dumpfile.read(1)
i -= 1
if (verbose):
print
print
print
print
print
print

""
"
"
"
"
""

# Get Process' Name

The chosen Process is:"
PID: %d" % pid
Name: %s @ 0x%08x" % (comm, task_addr)
Output File : %s" % outString

if (verbose):
print " + Getting Process' State....."
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + state_offset)
state, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
# print "State = %02d" % state

# Get Process' Running State

if (verbose):
print " + Getting Process' Flags....."
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + flags_offset)
flags, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
# print "Flags = 0x%08x" % flags

# Get Process' flags
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if (verbose):
print " + Getting Process' Memory Mappings....."
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + mm_offset)
mm_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
# Get Process' mm_struct Base Address
if mm_addr < kernel_start :
print "This Process has an invalid memory map!!!"
print "Exiting ......"
print ""
sys.exit(0)
mm_struct = AddresSpace(mm_addr)
vmstruct = mm_struct.getVmStruct(dumpfile)
pgd = mm_struct.getPgd(dumpfile)

# Get Memory Map Structure of process
# Get Process' PGD

#print hex(pgd)
seglist = mm_struct.getAllVmAreas(dumpfile)

# Get a list of vm_area_structs

if (verbose):
print " + Getting Process' Credentials....."
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + cred_offset)
cred_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) # Get Process' Credentials Base Address
cred = getCred(cred_addr, dumpfile)
# print cred
if (verbose):
print " + Getting Process' Kernel Mode Stack....."
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + sp0_offset)
kmstack_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
# Get Process' Kernel Mode Stack Base
Address
if (verbose):
print " + Kernel Mode Stack Pointer:
sp_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
if (verbose):
print " + Stack Pointer:

0x%08x" %kmstack_addr
# Get Process' Stack Pointer

0x%08x" %sp_addr

ip_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
ip_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
dumpfile.seek(ip_addr - kernel_start)
ip_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
#print hex(sp_addr)
#print hex(kmstack_addr)
# dumpfile.seek(task_addr + fs_offset)
# fs_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) # Get Process' fs_struct Base Address

if (verbose):
print " + Getting Process' Open Files....."
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + files_offset)
files_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) # Get Process' files_struct Base Address
open_files = getOpenFiles(files_addr, dumpfile)
# Get a list of opened files
open_files = open_files[3:]
# The first 3 are stdin, stdout and stderr

if (verbose):
print " + Getting Process' Signals....."
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + sighand_offset)
sighand_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))
# Get Process' Signal Handlers address
sighand_addr += 4
# Address of Signal Actions
# sighand = getSigHand(sighand_addr, dumpfile)
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + sigblocked_offset)
blocked, = struct.unpack('<d', dumpfile.read(8))
# print "0x%016x" % blocked

# Blocked signals
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dumpfile.seek(task_addr + sigpending_offset + 8)
pending, = struct.unpack('<d', dumpfile.read(8))

# Get Process' pending signals

# -----All the infos about a Process in a structure-------------------process = Structure(task_addr = task_addr, pid = pid, name = comm, state = state,
flags = flags,seglist = seglist, cred = cred, vmstruct = vmstruct, kmstack =
kmstack_addr,
open_files = open_files, sp_addr = sp_addr, pgd = pgd,
sig_actions = sighand_addr, sig_blocked = blocked,
sig_pending = pending)

if (verbose):
print " + Building XML File....."
done = buildXml(process, outString, dumpfile)
if (done):
print "An error Occured while saving the process!!!"
dumpfile.close()
sys.exit(0)
dumpfile.close()
print "Done. "
print " "

# Build XML File

APPENDIX D: XML SCHEMA FOR GETTSK’S OUTPUT

<? xml version = “1.0”?>
<xs: element name=”process”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”pid” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs: element name=”name” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:element name=”state” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs:element name=”flags” type=”xs:integer”/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”credentials”>
<xs:attribute name=”uid” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs:attribute name=”gid” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs:attribute name=”euid” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs:attribute name=”egid” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs:attribute name=”fsuid” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs:attribute name=”fsgid” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs:attribute name=”suid” type=”xs:integer”/>
<xs:attribute name=”sgid” type=”xs:integer”/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”reg_set” type=”xs:string”>
<xs:attribute name=”encoding” type=”xs:string” default=”binary-base64”/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”vmstruct”>
<xs:attribute name=”start_code” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”end_code” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”start_data” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”end_data” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”start_brk” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”brk” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”arg_start” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”arg_end” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”start_stack” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”env_start” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”env_end” type=”xs:string”/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”segments”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”vm_region” type”xs:string” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xs:attribute name=”encoding” type=”xs:string” default=”binary-base64”/>
<xs:attribute name=”vm_start” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”vm_end” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”vm_pgprot” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”vm_pgoff” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”vm_flags” type=”xs:string”/>
<xs:attribute name=”num_pages” type=”xs:integer”/>
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<xs:attribute name=”filename” type=”xs:string” use=”optional”/>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name=”number” type=”xs:integer”>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”open_files”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:element name=”file” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:attribute name=”pathname” type=”xs:string”/>
</xs:element>
<xs:attribute name=”Number” type=”xs:integer”>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”signals”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”sig_actions” type=”xs:strings”>
<xs:attribute name=”encoding” type=”xs:string” default=”binary-base64”/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”sig_blocked” type=”xs:strings”>
<xs:attribute name=”value” type=”xs:string”/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”sig_pending” type=”xs:strings”>
<xs:attribute name=”value” type=”xs:string”/>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:elements>
<xs:attribute name=”arch” type=”xs:string” default=”x86”/>
<xs:attribute name=”kernel” type=”xs:string” default=”2.6.35.8”/>
<xs:attribute name=”magic_number” type=”xs:string” default=”FFC0”>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

APPENDIX E: MEMEXEC SOURCE CODE

This is the source code of the 3 files constituting the memexec tool: memexec.c,
memexec.h

and memlkm.c. Also included is the Makefile used to compile them.

******************** memexec.h ******************************
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/ipc.h>
#include <asm/param.h>
#define
#define
#define
#define

MEMPROC_SIZE sizeof(struct memproc)
MAX_FILENAME
256
MAX_PATH
256
PAGES
4096 // Page Size

/* IOCTL */
#define
#define
#define
#define

MAGIC_NUMBER 0xCC
IOCTL_RESTART
MAX_IOC_NR 1
DEV_FILE
"/dev/memexec"

_IOW(MAGIC_NUMBER, 1, struct memproc *)

struct credentials {
int uid, gid, suid, sgid, euid, egid, fsuid, fsgid;
};
struct registers {
int size;
char *regs;
};
struct signals {
int sig_actions_size;
char *sig_actions;
unsigned long sig_blocked, sig_pending;
};
struct vmstruct {
unsigned long start_code, end_code, start_data, end_data;
unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack, arg_start, arg_end;
unsigned long env_start, env_end;
};
struct frames {
unsigned long present;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long offset;
char entry_type[3];
unsigned long vm_start, vm_end;
char *contents;
};

struct segments {
unsigned long vm_start, vm_end, prot, flags, pgoff;
int num_pages;
int vm_file;
char local_file[MAX_PATH];
// Local file storing the contents of the segment.
char filename[MAX_FILENAME];
//char *contents;
struct frames *framelist; /* Frames associated with each segment */
};
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struct open_file {
/* Not Fully supported - Now only shows open file's path */
char * path;
};

struct memproc {
unsigned long old_pid, state, flags;
int seg_num;
/* Number of Segments */
int file_num;
/* Number of Open Files */
char name[16];
struct registers reg_set;
struct credentials memcred;
struct vmstruct vm_map;
struct segments *seglist;
struct open_file *filelist;
struct signals sig;
};
static inline void mem_strncpy(char * src, const char * dest, int size) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
src[i] = dest[i];
}
}

******************** End memexec.h ******************************

******************** memelkm.c ******************************

/* Standard in kernel modules */
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
/* We're doing kernel work */
#include <linux/module.h>
/* Specifically, a module */
/* For character devices */
#include <linux/fs.h>
/* The character device
* definitions are here */
#include <linux/cdev.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <asm/mman.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h> /* for KERNEL_DS and get_fs() */
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/sys.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
//#include <linux/swapops.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "memexec.h"

/* verbose printks */
const int verbose = 1;

static inline unsigned long get_mmap_flags(unsigned short vm_flags) {
return MAP_FIXED |
(vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE? MAP_SHARED : MAP_PRIVATE) |
(vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) |
(vm_flags & MAP_FIXED) |
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(vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE)
;
}
/*
Restart a process.
*/
static int restart(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long arg,
unsigned long stack_size)
{
struct memproc *mem;
struct pt_regs *regs;
struct pt_regs *tmp;
struct pt_regs *tmp1;
int ret;
int err, i, k;
mm_segment_t fs;
sigset_t * blocked;
struct sighand_struct *sig;

mem = (struct memproc*)kmalloc(sizeof(struct memproc), GFP_KERNEL);
// arg is the pointer to param
if (copy_from_user(mem, (struct memproc *)arg, sizeof(struct memproc)))
return -EFAULT;
fs = get_fs();
err = -ENOMEM;
// Restore command name
mem_strncpy(current->comm, mem->name, 16);
printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: %s \n", current->comm);
if (verbose)
printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring Flags\n");
current->flags = mem->flags;
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
if (verbose)
printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring vm areas\n");
/* Map all the segments */
for (i=0; i<mem->seg_num; i++)
{
unsigned long size;
unsigned long mmap_prot, mmap_flags;
struct file *file;
int omode = O_RDONLY;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
size = mem->seglist[i].vm_end - mem->seglist[i].vm_start;
mmap_prot = mem->seglist[i].flags & 7;
mmap_flags = get_mmap_flags(mem->seglist[i].flags);
set_fs(fs);
if ( (mmap_prot&PROT_WRITE) && (mmap_flags&MAP_SHARED) &&
!(mmap_flags&MAP_DENYWRITE))
omode = O_RDWR;
if (mem->seglist[i].num_pages == 0)
continue;
if (mem->seglist[i].vm_file == 0)
{
down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
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if ((mmap_flags&MAP_GROWSDOWN) || !(mmap_flags&MAP_EXECUTABLE))
ret = do_mmap(NULL, mem->seglist[i].vm_start, size, mmap_prot|PROT_WRITE,
mmap_flags, 0);
up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
if (ret != mem->seglist[i].vm_start)
printk(KERN_INFO "Error in mmap %08lx!! Received %d !\n",
mem->seglist[i].vm_start, ret);
for (k=0; k<=mem->seglist[i].num_pages - 1; k++)
{
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
if (mem->seglist[i].num_pages == 0)
break;
if ((ret = copy_to_user((void *)mem->seglist[i].framelist[k].vm_start,
mem>seglist[i].framelist[k].contents,
PAGE_SIZE)) > 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "Fail Copy??... 0x%08lx, %d \n",
mem->seglist[i].framelist[k].vm_start, ret);
}
}
else
{
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
file = filp_open(mem->seglist[i].filename, omode, 0);
size = mem->seglist[i].vm_end - mem->seglist[i].vm_start;
down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
ret = do_mmap_pgoff(file, mem->seglist[i].vm_start, size, mmap_prot,
mmap_flags, mem->seglist[i].pgoff);
up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
fput(file);
if (ret != mem->seglist[i].vm_start)
printk("Error in mmap %08lx!! Received %08x !\n",
mem->seglist[i].vm_start, ret);
}
}
set_fs(fs);
/* Restore the memory mapping */
if (verbose)
printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring vm structure\n");
down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
current->mm->start_code
current->mm->end_code
current->mm->start_data
current->mm->end_data
current->mm->start_brk
current->mm->brk
current->mm->start_stack
current->mm->arg_start
current->mm->arg_end
current->mm->env_start
current->mm->env_end

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

mem->vm_map.start_code;
mem->vm_map.end_code;
mem->vm_map.start_data;
mem->vm_map.end_data;
mem->vm_map.start_brk;
mem->vm_map.brk;
mem->vm_map.start_stack;
mem->vm_map.arg_start;
mem->vm_map.arg_end;
mem->vm_map.env_start;
mem->vm_map.env_end;

up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
if (verbose)
printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring registers\n");
regs = task_pt_regs(current);
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tmp = (struct pt_regs *)mem->reg_set.regs;
tmp1 = (struct pt_regs *)kmalloc(sizeof(struct pt_regs), GFP_KERNEL);
*regs = *tmp;

/*
FILES
*/
//if (verbose)
// printk("Restoring file table\n");
/******************/
/*
SIGNALS
*/
/******************/
if (verbose)
printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring signal handlers\n");
sig = (struct sighand_struct *) mem->sig.sig_actions;
atomic_set(&sig->count, 1);
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++)
{
current->sighand->action[i] = sig->action[i];
if (i== SIGSTOP-1 || i == SIGKILL -1)
{
current->sighand->action[i].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
current->sighand->action[i].sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigemptyset(&current->sighand->action[i].sa.sa_mask);
}
sigdelsetmask(&current->sighand->action[i].sa.sa_mask,
sigmask(SIGKILL)|sigmask(SIGSTOP));
}
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
blocked = (sigset_t *)&mem->sig.sig_blocked;
for (i = 0; i < _NSIG_WORDS; i++)
current->blocked.sig[i] = blocked->sig[i];
// Restore Process' State
current->state = TASK_RUNNING; //mem->state;
if (verbose)
printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: *** RESTART: done ***\n");
err = 0;
return err;
}

/* Device Declarations **************************** */
/* The name for our device, as it will appear
* in /proc/devices */
#define DEVICE_NAME "memexec"
int memexec_open(struct inode *inode,
struct file *file) {
return 0;
}
int memexec_release(struct inode *inode,
struct file *file) {
return 0;
}
/*
* ioctl impl. for checkpoint. Primary means to interact with device.
*/
int memexec_ioctl(struct inode * inode_i, struct file * file,
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unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) {
/* Quick error checking. */
if(_IOC_TYPE(cmd) != MAGIC_NUMBER) return -ENOTTY;
if(_IOC_NR(cmd) > MAX_IOC_NR) return -ENOTTY;
// do restart here
if (cmd == IOCTL_RESTART)
return restart(SIGCHLD, arg, 0);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Module Declarations ***************************** */
static int major;
struct file_operations memexec_fops = {
owner:
THIS_MODULE,
ioctl:
memexec_ioctl,
open:
memexec_open,
release:
memexec_release,
};
int memexec_init(void)
{
int result;
result = register_chrdev(0, DEVICE_NAME, &memexec_fops);
if(result < 0){
printk(KERN_ALERT "Registering Device Failed w/ major %d.\n", major);
return result;
}
if(verbose)
printk(KERN_INFO "*****Device Memexec Loaded!!!*****");
major = result;
return 0;
}
void memexec_cleanup(void)
{
unregister_chrdev(major, DEVICE_NAME);
}
module_init(memexec_init);
module_exit(memexec_cleanup);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

******************** End memlkm.c ******************************

******************** memexec.c ******************************
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<stdio.h>
<string.h>
<stdlib.h>
<ctype.h>
<errno.h>
<unistd.h>
<sys/types.h>
<sys/stat.h>
<sys/ioctl.h>
<fcntl.h>
<netdb.h>
<arpa/inet.h>
<sys/mman.h>

#include <libxml/xmlmemory.h>
#include <libxml/tree.h>
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#include <libxml/parser.h>
#include "memexec.h"
/*
** Translation Table as described in RFC1113
*/
static const char cb64[]="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
/*
** Translation Table to decode (created by author)
*/
static const char
cd64[]="|$$$}rstuvwxyz{$$$$$$$>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW$$$$$$XYZ[\\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopq";
/*
** decodeblock
**
** decode 4 '6-bit' characters into 3 8-bit binary bytes
*/
void decodeblock( unsigned char in[4], unsigned char out[3] )
{
out[ 0 ] = (unsigned char ) (in[0] << 2 | in[1] >> 4);
out[ 1 ] = (unsigned char ) (in[1] << 4 | in[2] >> 2);
out[ 2 ] = (unsigned char ) (((in[2] << 6) & 0xc0) | in[3]);
}
/*
** decode
**
** decode a base64 encoded stream discarding padding, line breaks and noise
*/
static int b64decode(char *src, char *dst )
{
unsigned char in[4], out[3], v;
int i, len, size;
char *tmpptr;
FILE *pFile;
pFile = fopen(".out", "wb+");
tmpptr = src;
while( *tmpptr )
{
for( len = 0, i = 0; i < 4 && *tmpptr; i++ )
{
v = 0;
while( *tmpptr && v == 0 )
{
v = (unsigned char) (*tmpptr);
v = (unsigned char) ((v < 43 || v > 122) ? 0 : cd64[ v - 43 ]);
if( v )
{
v = (unsigned char) ((v == '$') ? 0 : v - 61);
}
tmpptr++;
}
if( *tmpptr )
{
len++;
if( v )
{
in[ i ] = (unsigned char) (v - 1);
}
}
else
{
in[i] = 0;
}
}
if( len )
{
decodeblock( in, out );
for( i = 0; i < len - 1; i++ )
putc( out[i], pFile );
}
}
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fseek(pFile, 0, SEEK_END);
size = ftell(pFile);
fseek(pFile, 0, SEEK_SET);
fread(dst, size, 1, pFile);
fclose(pFile);
return size;
}
void dump_buffer(void *buffer, int buffer_size)
{
int i;
for(i = 0;i < buffer_size;++i)
printf("%c", ((char *)buffer)[i]);
}
static void mem_copy(char * dst, char * src, size_t size)
{
char *tmp;
int i = 0;
for (tmp = src;i<size;++tmp)
{
dst[i] = *tmp;
i++;
}
dst[i] = '\0';
}
static int stripSpaces(char* in)
{

// Remove White spaces

char *ret;
char *tmp;
int i = 0;
int j = 0;
ret = malloc(strlen(in)+1);
for (tmp = in;*tmp!='\0';++tmp)
{
if (!isspace(*tmp))
{
ret[j] = *tmp;
j++;
}
}
ret[j] = '\0';
mem_copy(in, ret, j);
free(ret);
return 0;
}
static void parseDoc(char *docname, struct memproc * input) //Parse XML document
{
xmlDocPtr doc;
xmlNodePtr cur, child;
xmlChar *key;
char *test, *str;
int size, err;
doc = xmlParseFile(docname);
if (doc == NULL ) {
fprintf(stderr,"Document not parsed successfully. \n");
return;
}
cur = xmlDocGetRootElement(doc);
if (cur == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"empty document\n");
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return;
}
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if (xmlStrcmp(cur->name, (const xmlChar *) "process")) {
fprintf(stderr,"document of the wrong type, root node != process");
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return;
}
cur = cur->xmlChildrenNode;
/************* GET OLD PID *************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"old_pid")))
{
key = xmlNodeGetContent(child->xmlChildrenNode);
input->old_pid = atoi(key);
//printf("OLD_PID: %ld \n", input->old_pid);
xmlFree(key);
break;
}
child = child->next;
}
/*********** GET NAME ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"name")))
{
key = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, child->xmlChildrenNode, 1);
test = (char *)key;
err = stripSpaces(test);
strcpy(input->name, test);
//printf("NAME: %s\n", input->name);
xmlFree(key);
break;
}
child = child->next;
}
/*********** GET STATE ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"state")))
{
key = xmlNodeGetContent(child->xmlChildrenNode);
input->state = atoi(key);
//printf("STATE: %ld \n", input->state);
xmlFree(key);
break;
}
child = child->next;
}
/*********** GET FLAGS ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"flags")))
{
key = xmlGetProp(child, "value");
input->flags = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); // String to unsigned long
//printf("FLAGS: 0x%08x \n", (int) input->flags);
xmlFree(key);
break;
}
child = child->next;
}
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/*********** GET CREDENTIALS ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"credentials")))
{
key = xmlGetProp(child, "uid");
input->memcred.uid = atoi(key);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "gid");
input->memcred.gid = atoi(key);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "euid");
input->memcred.euid = atoi(key);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "egid");
input->memcred.egid = atoi(key);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "suid");
input->memcred.suid = atoi(key);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "sgid");
input->memcred.sgid = atoi(key);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "fsuid");
input->memcred.fsuid = atoi(key);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "fsgid");
input->memcred.fsgid = atoi(key);
//printf("CREDENTIALS - UID: %d
xmlFree(key);
break;

\n", input->memcred.uid);

}
child = child->next;
}
/*********** GET REGISTERS ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"reg_set")))
{
key = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, child->xmlChildrenNode, 1);
test = (char *)key;
err = stripSpaces(test);
str = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1);
input->reg_set.regs = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1);
str[0] = '\0';
size = b64decode(test, str);
mem_copy(input->reg_set.regs, str, size);
input->reg_set.size = size;
xmlFree(key);
free(str);
break;
}
child = child->next;
}
/*********** GET VMSTRUCT ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"vmstruct")))
{
key = xmlGetProp(child, "start_code");
input->vm_map.start_code = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "end_code");
input->vm_map.end_code = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "start_data");
input->vm_map.start_data = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "end_data");
input->vm_map.end_data = atoi(key);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "start_brk");
input->vm_map.start_brk = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(child, "brk");
input->vm_map.brk = atoi(key);
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key = xmlGetProp(child,
input->vm_map.arg_start
key = xmlGetProp(child,
input->vm_map.arg_end =

"arg_start");
= strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
"arg_end");
strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);

key = xmlGetProp(child,
input->vm_map.env_start
key = xmlGetProp(child,
input->vm_map.env_end =

"env_start");
= strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
"env_end");
strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);

key = xmlGetProp(child, "start_stack");
input->vm_map.start_stack = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
xmlFree(key);
break;
}
child = child->next;
}
/*********** GET SEGMENTS ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"segments")))
{
xmlNodePtr ptr1, ptr2;
int k1 = 0;
key = xmlGetProp(child, "number");
input->seg_num = atoi(key);
input->seglist = (struct segments *)malloc(sizeof(struct segments[input>seg_num]));
ptr1 = child->xmlChildrenNode;
while (ptr1 != NULL)

// Parse

each region of a segment
{
if ((!xmlStrcmp(ptr1->name, (const xmlChar *)"vm_region")))
{
key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_start");
input->seglist[k1].vm_start = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_end");
input->seglist[k1].vm_end = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_pgprot");
input->seglist[k1].prot = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_flags");
input->seglist[k1].flags = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_pgoff");
input->seglist[k1].pgoff = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "num_pages");
input->seglist[k1].num_pages = atoi(key);
input->seglist[k1].framelist = (struct frames
*)malloc(sizeof(struct frames[input->seglist[k1].num_pages]));
if (key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "filename"))
{
strcpy(input->seglist[k1].filename, (char *)key);
input->seglist[k1].vm_file = 1;
}
else
{
input->seglist[k1].vm_file = 0;
strcpy(input->seglist[k1].filename, "");
}
ptr2 = ptr1->xmlChildrenNode;
int k2 = 0;
while (ptr2 != NULL)
// Parse each frame of a region
{
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if ((!xmlStrcmp(ptr2->name, (const xmlChar
*)"vm_frame")))
{
key = xmlGetProp(ptr2, "vm_start");
input->seglist[k1].framelist[k2].vm_start
= strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(ptr2, "vm_end");
input->seglist[k1].framelist[k2].vm_end =
strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(ptr2, "flags");
input->seglist[k1].framelist[k2].flags =
strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
key = xmlGetProp(ptr2, "offset");
input->seglist[k1].framelist[k2].offset =
strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
if ( (input->seglist[k1].vm_file == 0) &&
(key = xmlNodeListGetString(doc,
ptr2->xmlChildrenNode, 1)) )
{
test = (char *)key;
err = stripSpaces(test);
str = (char
*)malloc(strlen(test) + 1);
str[0] = '\0';
input>seglist[k1].framelist[k2].contents = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1);
size = b64decode(test,
str);
mem_copy(input>seglist[k1].framelist[k2].contents, str, size);
}
else
{
input>seglist[k1].framelist[k2].contents = (char *)malloc(2);
mem_copy(input>seglist[k1].framelist[k2].contents, "\0", 2);
}
k2++;
}
ptr2 = ptr2->next;
}
k1++;
}
ptr1 = ptr1->next;
}
xmlFree(key);
}
child = child->next;
}

/*********** GET OPEN FILES ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"open_files")))
{
xmlNodePtr ptr;
int k = 0;
key = xmlGetProp(child, "Number");
input->file_num = atoi(key);
if (input->file_num == 0)
break;
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struct open_file tmp[input->file_num];
ptr = child->xmlChildrenNode;
while (ptr != NULL)
{
if ((!xmlStrcmp(ptr->name, (const xmlChar *)"vm_region")))
{
key = xmlGetProp(ptr, "path");
tmp[k].path = malloc(strlen(key) + 1);
strcpy(tmp[k].path, (char *) key);
k++;
}
ptr = ptr->next;
}
xmlFree(key);
input->filelist = malloc(sizeof(tmp) + 1);
input->filelist = tmp;
break;
}
child = child->next;
}
/*********** GET SIGNALS ***************/
child = cur;
while (child != NULL) {
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"signals")))
{
child = child->xmlChildrenNode;
while (child != NULL)
{
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"sig_actions")))
{
key = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, child->xmlChildrenNode, 1);
test = (char *)key;
err = stripSpaces(test);
str = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1);
str[0] = '\0';
input->sig.sig_actions = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1);
size = b64decode(test, str);
mem_copy(input->sig.sig_actions, str, size);
input->sig.sig_actions_size = size;
}
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"sig_blocked")))
{
key = xmlGetProp(child, "value");
input->sig.sig_blocked = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
}
if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"sig_pending")))
{
key = xmlGetProp(child, "value");
input->sig.sig_pending = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);
}
child = child->next;
}
xmlFree(key);
break;
}
child = child->next;
}
xmlFreeDoc(doc);
return;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
struct memproc *input;
char *docname;
int ret;
int dev_fd = 0;
int l, k;
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if (argc <= 1) {
printf("Usage: %s docname\n", argv[0]);
return(0);
}
input = (struct memproc *)malloc(sizeof(struct memproc));
docname = argv[1];
parseDoc (docname, input);
dev_fd = open(DEV_FILE, 0);
if (dev_fd<0)
{
printf("Cannot open device file.... file_desc = %d\n", dev_fd);
exit (-1);
}
printf("Device file opened: %d\n", dev_fd);
ret = ioctl(dev_fd, IOCTL_RESTART, input);
close(dev_fd);
free(input);
printf("Done....\n");
return (1);
}

******************** end memexec.c ******************************

******************** Makefile ******************************
KDIR := /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build
PWD := $(shell pwd)
obj-m += memlkm.o
all:

memlkm
gcc memexec.c -o memexec -I/usr/include/libxml2 -lxml2

memlkm:
make -Wall -C $(KDIR) SUBDIRS=$(PWD) modules
clean:
make -Wall -C
rm memexec

$(KDIR) SUBDIRS=$(PWD) modules clean
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